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ABSTRACT
Global loss and degradation of forests are well documented, and the potential role
of forests in climate change mitigation is widely recognized. While forests are key to
human well-being, forest resource management in the developing world is fraught with
governance challenges. Despite policy discourses that emphasize the importance of local
participation in the management of forest resources, it is rarely practiced. Many national
governments and non-governmental organizations have set up efforts around the
collaborative management of forest resources with local communities to tackle forest
loss. However, the operationalization of participatory principles and the effectiveness of
these collaborative initiatives are not well understood. In this dissertation, I analyze the
mobilization of participatory discourses within the context of a poorly studied
community-based resource conservation initiative: a Community-Based Resource
Management Area (CREMA) in Ghana. It is also a site for a Reducing Emissions from
Deforestation and Degradation (REDD+) pilot project. Using governmentality as a
theoretical lens, I explore the governmental rationalities of these projects to understand
how discourses on deforestation, forest degradation, and community participation were
used by various actors to shape the conduct of project stakeholders and achieve the
project’s instrumental objectives. This project was justified through expert discourses and
knowledge that institutionalized tree planting in the thinking and practices of cocoa
farmers as a means of remedying deforestation issues. As I demonstrate, farmers engaged
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with agroforestry because they anticipated benefits, including private property rights over
“planted trees” and tradable claims over “carbon” sequestered by the planted trees.
However, these global and national policies mobilized discourses of participation and
safeguards to attract stakeholders at various scales, to improveforest governance or to
build robust democratic institutions. The contradictions between discourse and practice in
the case of this CREMA reflect larger challenges in forest governance globally, call into
question the logic of conservation and sustainable use of forest resources and hamper
local democratic participation and social justice outcomes that these interventions claim
as expected outcomes.
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CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION
1.1 Introduction
I am a cocoa farmer, and that is what I do. Why should I plant trees?
Why do we have to listen to the government, which cuts down all the trees for
timber, now telling us to plant trees, for CREMA, for carbon and so on?1
A farmer thus expressed his predicament about planting trees during a meeting
that marked the beginning of my fieldwork in Ghana’s Western Region, well known for
its cocoa production. His protest emerged in that setting because he knew the subject of
my research. It was at my request that the village chief2 and elders3 had organized the
meeting so that I could seek permission from them to allow me to stay and carry out my
research. During the earlier part of the meeting, when we made our introductions, I had to
state my “mission”4—to examine people’s participation in agroforestry promoted by two

1

Cocoa farmer, 46 years; Male, Western Region, Ghana, 2012, interpreted from Twi on site.

2

Customary leaders based on a kinship-based system.

3

Consisting of men and women who are married, with children, influential, and related to the
founding family/ies of the village. For men, financial independence, property ownership, and so
on play important role in terms of who is considered an elder. For women, it is also related to
having independent sources of income, property, if she is the head of a household, presence of
other younger adult women (daughter in law, daughters) who take care of the household chores.
Elders advise the chief on matters regarding village administration; there are no strict number
requirement for people on the Council, and it depends on the village population.
It is customary among Akan hosts in Ghana to enquire about a visitor’s mission or purpose of
visit. Conversation and activities follow once the hosts welcome the visitor by shaking hands.
Gifts are usually exchanged.
4

1

ongoing projects in the area—the Community5 Resource Management Areas (CREMAs)
and Reducing Emissions from Deforestation and Degradation (REDD+) pilot.
Participation with regard to my research means the transfer of secure discretionary
powers and rights to locally-accountable bodies who represent people’s needs and
aspirations, and who are accountable to their constituents for their decisions and actions
(Ribot 2002).In the context of decentralized interventions, it is important to frame
participation in terms of responsiveness and accountability, if local people are to be
enfranchised as citizens and participatory approaches to natural resource management
including forestry are to achieve what they aspire - to devolve decision making and
benefits from forests to local populations, along with responsibilities for forest
management. Often the latter is achieved through community based and decentralized
initiatives where local populations just remain dependent subjects with added
responsibilities but without secure rights and benefits.
This incident placed me and my research into a particular history and set of
practices because interplanting cocoa with both indigenous and exotic tree species such
as cidrella, odum, and teak has long been promoted by various institutions in Ghana,
primarily for creating agroforestry concessions, diversifying incomes, and providing
ecosystem services such as carbon sequestration and restoring degraded forests. It was
believed that on-farm availability of timber would lessen the pressure on forest reserves,
of which most were severely degraded (Hawthorne and Abu-Juam 1995). Farmers have
also selectively retained certain plant species, such as kola nuts and fruit trees, in farms

5

The term community/ies used in this dissertation refers to the targeted beneficiaries of the past
and ongoing interventions through participation, engagement, or other development actions.

2

for additional income, for domestic use, or to boost cocoa production. Therefore, this
farmer’s question was a means of challenging the ways state bureaucracies have dictated
the terms of engagement in the forestry sector. However, the village linguist,6 a retired
schoolteacher and a stakeholder in the ongoing projects, decided to respond.7 He listed all
the benefits associated with trees—ecosystem services, wood, and non-timber forests
products, and the possibility of additional income from selling carbon credits. After he
had finished, he asked me to respond. I began by acknowledging not having the answers
that could explain the government’s contradictory positions on trees. Hence, the objective
of my research, I stated, was to examine some of those contradictions in the context of
the ongoing projects in the area and potentially address some of the issues in forest
resource management created by these inconsistencies. This particular incident also lays
bare some power relations in my research context—the linguist, because of his age and
status, felt free to answer for me, and to lecture other farmers, thus potentially allowing
his interests and role in the projects to drown out other voices.
In retrospect, it is easy to see that in my response I was establishing the
significance of my research to the community, and rationalizing my presence in the area.
I first acknowledged the farmer’s assessment of the deficiency in existing agroforestry
practices, a problem that needs to be fixed, and then utilized the strategy of promising
anticipated benefits of my work to my hosts, many of whom were going to be my

While the position of “linguist” is a common one among the Akan, in this case, the role was
more than ceremonial as the village chief did not speak English and the teacher was fluent in Twi
and English.
6

7

While facing the gathering, he began by interpreting the question for me and proceeded to
answer it. My research assistant sitting next to me also interpreted the question and quickly wrote
it down for me in her field note book.

3

interview participants. My goals were as aspirational as that of the projects I was set to
examine. My strategy was also not entirely different from how these projects mobilized
various elements such as discourses, institutions, regulatory decisions, and scientific
statements to engage local populations and direct their conduct to achieve desirable
environmental and social objectives—or benefits in the context of REDD+. This story
thus illustrates my research question: how are these resources “governed”—that is, how
are different actors’ interests aligned toward achieving forest conservation as well as
improving livelihoods? Who can speak? Who speaks for whom? It also brings out my
positionality as a socially situated subject in reproducing the existing discourses.
1.2 The Research Context
In this section, I explain some of the key ideas to contextualize this dissertation
research. It is important for the reader to understand the concepts of CREMAs, the
REDD+ mechanism, and the linkages between the two to situate the arguments and
claims made in this dissertation. A CREMA, as developed by the Ghanaian government,
is both a geographically defined area as well as an approach to integrate conservation and
rural development goals as part of a natural resource decentralization process (Asare,
Kyei, and Mason 2013). REDD+ is a global framework designed to financially
incentivize developing countries for any reductions in emissions realized through a
decrease in the conversion of forests to non-forests, and other land uses. In doing so,
countries have to demonstrate lower emission rates from a reference emission level (i.e.,
without REDD+). In Ghana, government thinking positions CREMAs as the appropriate
institutional mechanism for implementing REDD+ projects on the ground.

4

1.2.1 CREMAs in Ghana
CREMAs are a vehicle for governing forest resources that come out of a long
history of efforts to govern forests. Given that establishing protected areas in state-owned
forests has not succeeded in widely producing desired forest conservation outcomes in
Ghana, the Ghanaian state utilized collaborative resource management as an alternative
strategy to manage resources by partnering with local communities living around these
resources such as forests and wildlife. The Wildlife Division (WD) of the Ghanaian
Forestry Commission (FC) developed the CREMAs8 in Ghana. It aimed to address
wildlife management outside protected areas and forest reserves. Over time, the CREMA
approach became a model for decentralized resource management in Ghana, where it was
used to promote natural resource conservation and livelihood diversification outside of
protected areas. In post-Independence Ghana, the 1994 Forest and Wildlife Policy
marked the broader decentralization reforms in the natural resource sector. This policy
and subsequent reforms influenced the design of the CREMA approach. However,
despite the rhetoric, decentralization in the forestry sector in the country remains limited
(Teye 2011). The central state administrative institutions, particularly the FC, continue to
be reluctant to devolve decision making in forestry due to their substantial revenue
generating potential (Sasu 2004).
While initially, CREMAs established by the WD targeted the co-management of
the wildlife in protected areas, CREMAs now have extended their focus on any natural
resource they deem fit for conservation (Forestry Commission Ghana, 2004), including

8

During the 1990s, the Ghanaian state initiated a series of policies and programs claiming to
involve the local population in forest management and to give them a greater share of benefits
accruing in the forestry sector. These measures were collectively named as Collaborative
Resource Management Programs (CRMP).
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trees. The Ghanaian government identifies CREMAs as an important “participatory
model” and claims that the CREMAs will create the “right conditions” for democratic
participation, and opportunities and financial incentives for local communities to engage
in the conservation and management of forest resources. At present, there are over thirty
CREMAs in Ghana at various phases of the establishment process.
Despite the adoption of this approach and its spread through Ghana, community
forest management, and the decentralized natural resources governance offer no
guarantees of improved outcomes with regard to previous, state-led efforts. Such efforts
have resulted in mixed outcomes (Mayers and Vermeulen 2009; Tokede et al. 2005),
suggesting that success of community-based management is contingent on local
circumstances. For example, in some cases, they have led to enhancement of local
livelihood and improved income, forest conservation, and the transfer of discretionary
powers to local communities (Cronkleton, Pulhin, and Saigal 2012; Larson and Ribot
2007; Ribot, Lund, and Treue 2010). However in other cases, community forest
management interventions produced inequities in benefit sharing among local
stakeholders, the elite capture of benefits, and resulted in conflicts over local rights to
natural resources often marginalizing the less powerful more than before the
interventions (Charnley and Poe 2007; Ribot, Agrawal, and Larson 2006; Ribot, Lund,
and Treue 2010; Schreckenberg and Luttrell 2009; Tacconi 2007).
1.2.2 Reducing Emissions from Deforestation and Degradation
REDD+ is a climate change mitigation strategy framed around an incentive-based
compensation mechanism to conserve forest (and other carbon-rich habitats such as
mangroves and swamps) in a manner that prevents and reduces greenhouse gas
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emissions. REDD has evolved since it was first pitched as an idea by the governments of
Papua New Guinea and Costa Rica, during the 11th session of the Conference of the
Parties in Montreal.9 REDD initially focused on “reducing emissions from deforestation
and forest degradation.” It expanded to include three more objectives (a) Conservation of
forest carbon stocks, (b) Sustainable management of forests, and (c) Enhancement of
forest carbon stocks. This is how, at the 2010 COP-16 in Cancun, REDD became REDDplus (REDD+), to reflect these new components (“REDD+” 2017). With the inclusion of
a number of decisions related to REDD+ and forests in the Paris Agreement (COP21,
2015), forests once again found prominence as a key strategy for emission reduction and
mitigating climate change.
The primary goal of the REDD+ mechanism is to reduce global carbon emissions
by paying forest owners in developing countries for decreased CO2 emissions associated
with avoided deforestation and forest degradation and maintained carbon stocks (“REDD
- Warsaw Framework for REDD-Plus” 2013; “UN-REDD Programme” 2017). Benefit
schemes are therefore based on the difference between the actualized emissions and
projections from a historical baseline (UN-REDD 2009). These benefit schemes may
include both direct (e.g., cash payments) and indirect (e.g., improved governance,
availability of forest products, and ecosystem services) gains resulting from the
implementation of REDD+. Incentive-based conservation predates REDD+ and includes

The agenda item on “Reducing emissions from deforestation in developing countries and
approaches to stimulate action” was first introduced during COP 11 in Montreal in 2005. The
governments of Papua New Guinea and Costa Rica, supported by eight other parties, through
their submission FCCC/CP/2005/MISC.1, requested for this issue to be taken up on the agenda
(UNFCCC 2014) .
9
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Payments for Ecosystem Services (PES),10 a movement started in the early 1980s when
environmental economists (Pearce and Moran 1994) argued for putting a monetary value
on nature and its services to conserve it. Achieving forest conservation through this
approach seems straightforward in principle—forest owners (government, communities,
and individuals, depending on how ownership is defined) are compensated for
maintaining standing forests, offsetting their opportunity costs, and therefore leaving the
world with a greater stock of forest with which to take up emissions. However, in
practice, the approach has faced problems. These challenges include transaction costs
associated with identifying forest owners in systems of complex tenure (discussed later),
overlapping property rights and weak governance, more opportunity costs than benefits,
costly monitoring, reporting, and verification, and leakage.11 Another problem is
establishing additionality—that is, showing that reductions in deforestation and forest
degradation due to REDD+ activities are greater than they would have been without
REDD+ activities. Despite that, REDD+ has gained increasing traction among policy
makers as a potential solution to achieve conservation, development, and climate change
mitigation goals (Angelsen 2010).
REDD+ is implemented in three phases—readiness, piloting, or demonstration—
and includes policy reforms and full implementation including results-based action.12

10

Millennium Ecosystems Assessment in 2005 made the idea about ecosystem services popular.
MEA also triggered, a range of payment schemes for ecosystem services (e.g. biodiversity
conservation , ecotourism,, carbon storage)
‘Leakage refers to the fact that while deforestation might be avoided in one place, the forest
destroyers might move to another area of forest or to a different country’((REDD Monitor 2017).
11

12

REDD+ readiness phase includes activities implemented at the national level, such as
developing a REDD+ national strategy, setting a national reference level, establishing a forest
monitoring system, and institutional and technical capacity building activities, among other;

8

This step-wise approach is to ensure that REDD+ projects progressed seamlessly and
logically. Ghana’s involvement with the REDD process began in 2007, via the World
Bank’s Forest Carbon Partnership Facility (FCPF). Ghana has received REDD readiness
funds from both from the FCPF mechanism of the World Bank as well as non-FCPF
mechanisms (FCPF, Aug 2015). The first phase of Ghana’s REDD+ Readiness was
completed in November 2014. The main activities and outputs of phase I included
establishing mechanisms for benefit sharing, dispute resolution, social safeguards, and
the monitoring and evaluation framework, setting baseline emission levels, and a
measurement, reporting, and verification (MRV) systems. This phase also included
setting operational guidance and standards for national and sub-national REDD+
programs. At present (2016 onward), Ghana is in early implementation phase (2016–
2030) that includes monitoring, performance-based payments, and scaling up activities.
Ghana has opted for a nested national approach toward REDD implementation. This
mean Ghana will consider both national baselines, and if a project manages to adhere to
REDD-related activities, there may be a direct payment to beneficiaries (nested
approach).
1.2.3 CREMA as REDD+ Pilots
From a practical mitigation standpoint, it has been argued (Asare, Kyei, and
Mason 2013) that the CREMA has the potential to address many of the key challenges
for REDD. These challenges include boundary demarcation, free prior and informed
consent, ensuring democratic decision making, ensuring sustainability of institutions and

Piloting phase may involve testing the strategies, policies, and plans proposed in the readiness
phase. Implementation phase involves measurement, reporting, and verification of the results
under UNFCCC after which countries can access results-based payments.
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mechanisms, clarifying tenure and carbon rights, along with creating the right conditions
for equitable sharing of benefits. Since 2007, when Ghana began its involvement with the
REDD readiness phase through World Bank’s FCPF, there have been speculations about
the ability of CREMAs to generate carbon revenues in the near future. The FC of Ghana
supports the use of CREMAs for piloting forest carbon projects in the country. The
Ghana Wildlife Policy 2012 and Ghana’s REDD Readiness Preparation Proposal (R-PP)
support the CREMA approach as a means for implementing REDD demonstration
projects and pilots (Ghana REDD RPP 2010; Ghana Wildlife Policy 2012). Due to the
difference in stages of development and involvement in the carbon market and
certification schemes, no CREMA in Ghana has yet generated any revenues from
reducing emission.
The establishment of a CREMA area involves a series of administrative
procedures. It is a six-step process that involves: (a) defining governance structures, (b)
developing and approving the Constitution, (c) boundary demarcation, (d) by-law
preparation and approval by the DA, (e) recognition by the WD, and (f) authorization by
Minister of Lands and Forestry by Devolution of Management responsibilities to the
CREMA. The guidelines for CREMAs lay out a governance structure that would manage
the CREMA area. This structure involves institutions that operate at different scales.
First, at the village level, a Community Resource Management Committee (CMRC) is
elected by the villagers. The CMRCs handle the management of the CREMA at their
community. Then, CREMA members at the village level elect a representative from each
CMRC to the Executive Committee (CEC). CEC is the highest decision-making body

10

within the CREMA, and it includes the Divisional Chief of the Wassa Traditional area
(FC 2004b, 7).
1.2.4 The Value of Standing Trees
Using the earth’s resources responsibly and addressing poverty are two of our
greatest challenges, and climate change both problematizes and overtly connects them.
Curbing deforestation and forest degradation in tropical countries is argued to be a
potentially cost-effective way to reduce carbon emissions and address climate change
through land-use, land-use change, and forestry (LULUCF) activities (Canadell and
Raupach 2008; DeFries et al. 2007; Malhi et al. 2008). Among LULUCF activities,
afforestation, agroforestry, and reforestation respond to the need of enhancing
ecosystems, sequestering carbon, and shifting to a low carbon economy. This attention to
forests is not new. Forest conservation has been on the core agenda of international
conventions and agreements (e.g., the Millennium Development Goals, the Sustainable
Development Goals [SDGs], and Aichi targets)13 designed to achieve conservation and
development targets. It is only recently, however, that climate change has entered into
this conversation.
Agroforestry14 is being considered for use by many developing countries for Land
use, land-use change, and forestry (LULUCF) activities. This emphasis on agroforestry is
because of its potential for climate change mitigation and with components from both

13

Target 5—“By 2020, the rate of loss of all natural habitats, including forests, is at least halved
and where feasible brought close to zero, and degradation and fragmentation is significantly
reduced” of the Aichi Biodiversity Targets, Strategic Goal B—“Reduce the direct pressures on
biodiversity and promote sustainable use.”
14

In general terms, agroforestry is the association of trees with farming practices and can be
classified into several categories based on the agroforestry system’s structure, its function, its
socio-economic scale and level of management, and its ecological spread (Nair 1985, 97–128)
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agriculture and forestry, agroforestry activities are critical for livelihoods of the global
poor dependent on agriculture and forests (Anderson and Zerriffi 2012). An estimated 1.2
billion people in the developing world currently practice and benefit from agroforestry.
Scholars and practitioners have argued that agroforestry has the potential to
simultaneously tackle both climate change and help achieve development goals by
generating used on “co-benefits” (Garrity 2004; P.K. Ramachandran Nair et al. 2009;
Pandey 2007), such as the sequestration of carbon and the delivery of income, via
payments for carbon credits to poor populations living in and around forests. The postKyoto Protocol period has witnessed a surge in the establishment of financial
mechanisms to balance opportunity costs associated with pro-environment initiatives to
sequester carbon and reduce deforestation. The Bonn Challenge is another global effort to
restore 150 million hectares of degraded and deforested lands by 2020 and 350 million by
2030 (Ghazoul and Sheil 2010; IUCN Policy Brief 2017). Although these financial
mechanisms are primarily conceptualized and undertaken as interventions to enhance the
value of uncut forests and/or endorse reforestation activities, many have argued that they
can also help reduce poverty (Landell-Mills and Porras. 2002; Bishop and Pagiola 2012).
The forestry sector still comprises a valuable asset for Ghana’s economic
development, accounting for 3.5% of Ghana’s GDP and contributed USD1.3 billion
(FAO 2011) to the economy in 2011. However, the country incurs economic loss through
biodiversity loss due to deforestation and land degradation (Tutu, Ntiamoa-Baidu, and
Asuming-Brempong 1993). The main drivers of forest cover loss in Ghana are
agricultural expansion and wood exports in the wake of structural adjustment programs
(Benhin and Barbier 2004; Codjoe and Dzanku 2009; Owusu 1998). Other drivers of
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deforestation include wildfires, mining, and urbanization (roads, settlements, and other
infrastructural development). Ghana, in response to declining food production until the
1980s and dwindling forest cover, gradually shifted its agricultural policies and initiatives
to include modern agroforestry and agricultural intensification practices as stated in the
National Agroforestry Policy, 1986. The main objective of this policy was to use
agroforestry to promote sustainable land use (Terakawa 2002). Its early focus in the
1980s was to establish nurseries for tree seedlings to provide readily available seedlings
to farmers willing to adopt agroforestry technologies. Today, Ghana has trees in public,
private, and government plantations as well as within protected areas, forest reserves,
community forests, and in people’s farms.
Ghana is the second largest exporter of cocoa in the world, and therefore cocoa
plays a significant role in the Ghana’s economy (15% of Ghana’s GDP) (ICCO 2004).
However, the expansion15 of cocoa farms has also been alleged to be the primary driver
of deforestation in the country’s high forest zone (HFZ) (Hawthorne and Abu-Juam
1995), largely confined to the south-western part of Ghana. However, these existing
narratives of over-exploitation of “natural” forests for cocoa cultivation usually
overlook/downplay the specific historical conditions and social institutions that
accompany them at a national, regional, or local scale (Fairhead and Leach 1998). In the
early 1990s, this forest zone also saw agroforestry projects implemented by both foreign
and Ghanaian timber companies encouraging farmers to actively incorporate trees on

15

Traditionally maintaining or increasing cocoa production was associated with farm expansion
and not with intensification or improved farming practices; in response to widespread
deforestation and shrinkage of traditional cocoa growing areas, this is gradually changing—the
practices now lean toward restoration of old cocoa farms and reusing old farm land.

13

farm in an area gradually losing its forest cover (Appiah and Pedersen 1998; Prah 1994;
Richards and Asare 1999). Although the inclusion of suitable and valuable tree species16
at various phases of cocoa farm establishment is widely practiced by smallholders, tree
planting, particularly commercially valuable timber species, has faced resistance due to
complex land and tree tenure issues (discussed in later sections). Research by various
government and non-government institutions17 continues to look for the optimal shade
conditions for growing cocoa, and to identify suitable indigenous and exotic tree species
for cocoa agroforestry to harmonize tropical agricultural production with the surrounding
environment.
1.3 The Problem Statement
Since its inception in 2005, questions were raised about the long-term viability of
REDD+, particularly concerning financing. With the global economic crisis (2008–2009),
the landscape for REDD+ implementation looked discouraging (Peters-Stanley and
Daphne 2013). Although REDD+ projects are emerging as complex development
initiatives and are being implemented in many tropical forest regions of the world, till
now, they have been financed mainly through public sector finances with bilateral
organizations playing a major role (Norman and Nakhooda 2015). With the specific
inclusion of REDD+ in the Paris Agreement18 text during COP 21, the role of forests in
managing climate change impacts became solidified in the international climate agenda.

16

There are not too many studies on farmer preference but they prefer mixed tree species that
would fulfill household food and fiber needs and not only timber.
17

CRIG, Forestry Research Institute of Ghana, Conservation International, CARE, Kuapa Kooko,
and STCP-Ghana.
18

Historic agreement between 195 countries to keep global temperature rises below 2°C while at
the same time making significant efforts to limit the rise to no more than 1.5°.
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Also, there were also a number of pledges made during the Paris Agreement to increase
forest financing including significant pledges from Germany, Norway, and the United
Kingdom in support of REDD+. The Paris Agreement also ‘affirms’ the importance of
“public awareness, public participation, public access to information and cooperation at
all levels on the matters” addressed in the Agreement (Paris Agreement 2015). Looking
forward, with these strong endorsements, the developments around REDD+ and forest
governance are going to receive renewed attention. Also, under the SDG, environmental
protection, climate change mitigation, and poverty alleviation are now all connected—
and forest governance will be a key site where this plays out. Goal 15, of the SDGs,
specifically states, “Protect, restore and promote sustainable use of terrestrial ecosystems,
sustainably manage forests, combat desertification, and halt and reverse land degradation
and halt biodiversity loss”—once again emphasizing the role of the environment and
forests for sustainable development and human well-being.
REDD+ schemes have been piloted in many regions, but our knowledge about
REDD+ initiatives within a local context is limited (Bond 2010; Cohn et al. 2011). Some
tropical countries. civil society and indigenous people’s organizations are watchful of
REDD+-related development in their countries because of existing governance
challenges, lack of legal land rights and tenure issues, and therefore are critical and often
resist any possible government or private sector initiatives in this context (Angelsen
2008; Okereke and Dooley 2010). REDD+ projects are multidimensional in design, scale,
the place, and the social contexts in which they are going to be operationalized. Hence,
there are all sorts of conflicts that can arise between different types of knowledge and the
various stakeholders’ interests.
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The exploitation of natural resources in weak institutional and governance settings
can lead to internal conflicts of rights, access, and usage among local communities
(Collier and Hoeffler 2005). As discussed, the implementation of REDD+ is directly
linked to institutional structures, good governance, and the process of unifying the rights
of various forest-dwelling and indigenous groups. Successful outcomes from REDD+
will hinge upon resolution of conflicts (related to rights, access, and usage) and the
adequate representation of diverse goals and interests in a manner that aligns individual
and community interests with policy goals of REDD+. Overall, understanding the local
governance shaped by REDD+ is, therefore, crucial to reduce vulnerability, boost
economic and social wellbeing, and promote forest conservation and better management.
As discussed before, CREMAs modeled on participatory approaches to natural
resource management are being promoted as the ideal institutional set-up in Ghana for
piloting of REDD+ readiness projects. The particular CREMA in Wassa Amenfi West
District in the cocoa landscape of Western Ghana with a pro-poor REDD+ Readiness
project provided the ideal setting to examine forest governance issues in the context of
REDD+. The CREMA case, therefore, presents an opportunity to examine how
discourses on participation are materialized in practice, and in this dissertation I look at
“participation’ as “conduct of conduct” (Dean 1999).
1.4 Research Questions and Dissertation Overview
The empirical analysis in this dissertation uses data from the HFZ of the Western
Region of Ghana, where the activities of the Bontori CREMA and International Union for
Conservation of Nature (IUCN’s pilot pro-poor REDD project) overlapped—I use the
term focal interventions or CREMA/REDD+ to refer to these projects throughout the
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dissertation. Using empirical data collected through semi-structured interviews with both
cocoa farmers and government and non-governmental organization (NGO) officials
associated with the projects, this dissertation describes the governance contexts that
influence people to participate in the agroforestry activities.
With both global and national focus on the legitimacy of REDD+ projects
(Corbera and Schroeder 2011; Luttrell et al. 2013), equity issues in the distribution of
benefits (Okereke and Dooley 2010; McDermott, Mahanty, and Schreckenberg 2013),
and its importance for tropical forest conservation and mitigating climate change, it is
important to understand the contextual elements and practices that influence how project
stakeholders are participating in the process. However, these REDD+ projects espousing
participatory processes require accountability and representation to achieve equity,
justice, and efficiency in outcomes (Ribot 2002). Building on a comprehensive review of
the literature surrounding conservation and development, decentralization, and political
ecology, the empirical research for this dissertation began with two broad questions: (1)
Who participates in CREMA/REDD+ activities and why? Through this question, I want
to understand the responses of various actors toward the CREMA/REDD+, how do they
align and negotiate their expectations within the broader rationalities of the intervention,
and besides the regulatory practices, what are the political and economic motivations of
the various parties involved in the intervention. (2) How is participation achieved?
Through this question, I attempt to understand the various practices, rationalities, and
forms of incentives and punishments that are brought together to engage various
stakeholders so that the intended objectives (reducing emissions, deforestation, and
maintaining carbon stocks) of the REDD+ mechanism are achieved. I also attempt to
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understand if participation hinges on regulatory frameworks and the technologies of
remuneration and punishment or whether the making of responsible environmental
subjects is contingent on local context, uneven power relations, and diverse subject
positions of the farmers.
1.5 Chapter Outlines
This dissertation consists of six chapters. Chapter 1 introduces the research topic
and provided the background on collaborative resource management areas (CREMAs)
and REDD+ in Ghana and their contextual relevance for agroforestry activities associated
with conservation, rural development, and climate change mitigation goals. The chapter
then introduces the natural resource landscape of the Western Region of Ghana, land
tenure and tree tenure arrangements—elements that are framed both as problems and
technical fix, likely to optimize the achieving of objectives through REDD+.
Chapter 2 of this dissertation reviews theoretical approaches to conservation,
development, participation, community-based conservation to show that (1) communitybased natural resource management (CBNRM) approaches came out of a long history of
efforts to decentralize resource governance; (2) how REDD+ is reworking existing
elements of CBNRM for new purposes and defining “social protection” or “safeguards”
to address equity issues and account for past injustices in natural resource management;
(3) how “safeguards” such as community “participation” and “tenure” are not
straightforward; and (4) how these may impact benefit sharing and equity issues through
REDD+.
Chapter 3 focuses on the research methods. My main data source is semistructured interviews, and this chapter details the advantages of this method of data
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collection for this type of study and discusses some of the issues and limitations of this
approach. It also discusses the characteristics of the study population and the methods
used to recruit the study participants. I also draw data from government, NGO
documents, local newspaper articles, rural radio programs, and personal observations.
This chapter also provides an overview of data collection experiences and the methods I
use to analyze the data.
Drawing from the semi-structured interviews and review of policy documents,
Chapter 4 elaborates on how climate change and deforestation is problematized and
promised benefits through the ongoing projects is linked to governing the conducts of
cocoa farmers regarding farming practices. These alliances between parties who want to
govern with objectives such as (conservation, tenure rights, payments, livelihood
improvement, and sustainability) encourage people at the project sites to engage in
agroforestry activities despite their reservations against tree planting and skepticism
about equity issues in benefit sharing.
Chapter 5 shows the complicated ways and practices that the diverse interests of
the stakeholders are brought together, and connections are forged between them toward a
specific end of mitigating climate change, conservation, and improving rural livelihoods,
and how theses manifest themselves in the farmers’ narratives of their livelihoods and
well-being in the cocoa landscape of Western Ghana.
Chapter 6 starts with a description of the current status of the CREMA/REDD+ at
the study site. It then summarizes the main insights drawn from this empirical case,
drawing lessons from an analysis of the existing institutional setup and early REDD+
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implementation and how these findings contribute to the scholarship on forest
governance, climate change, and critical development studies.
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CHAPTER 2
CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK
2.1 Introduction
The central objective of this dissertation is to critically analyze the politics of
natural resource governance, local development, and climate change in the context of
CREMA/REDD+. In doing so, this study focuses on farmers’ participation in
agroforestry, the different subjectivities of the relevant actors, and the local contextual
elements that are likely to influence the realization of CREMA/REDD+ goals.
At their core, both CREMA and the REDD+ pilot initiatives seek to alter the
beliefs and practices and induce behavior change of cocoa-farmers by institutionalizing
their support for forest conservation, climate change mitigation, and improved livelihoods
through agroforestry (e.g., selling timber, payments for carbon credits). Both initiatives
are neoliberal in spirit, as they support decentralized community-based institutions,
encourage the privatization of state functions while advocating for private property rights
over “planted trees” and tradable claims over “carbon” sequestered by the planted trees.
While the CREMA, as a decentralized resource management strategy, seeks to reduce
pressure on protected forest reserves by garnering local support for off-reserve forest
management, the pro-poor REDD+ pilot seeks to institutionalize tree planting for forest
conservation and climate change mitigation into the thoughts and actions of cocoa
farmers, so that they not only become eager participants in REDD+ when it is fully
operationalized but will also conduct themselves consistent with REDD+ objectives in
the future (Birkenholtz 2009). Therefore, for analyzing, the practical elements from
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CREMA/REDD+ implementation, Foucault’s concepts of governmentality and the
technologies of governance (techniques of rewards and punishment) that emerge from
and (re)create governmentality, as seen through the lens of Agarwal’s
“environmentality,” offer a useful analytical framework.
Political ecology, a field that offers “empirical, research-based explorations to
explain linkages in the condition and change of social/environmental systems, with
explicit considerations of relations of power” (Robbins 2011), is another useful
framework for studying the social, economic, ecological, and political dimensions of the
CREMA/REDD+ intervention. Political ecologists have a long-standing engagement with
the plurality of perceptions and framings of environmental and resource problems
(Blaikie and Brookfield 1987; Bryant 1998; Escobar 1996; Robbins 2000). With multiple
sponsors, including a range of actors from transnational and national to local, REDD+
projects bring in a range of interests, knowledge types, and agendas. Further, studies
using this framework illustrated the role of expert knowledge and discourses in defining
problems and devising solutions to climate change (Peet and Watts 2011; Bumpus and
Liverman 2011). I have relied on this theoretical literature to frame my exploration of
differences, heterogeneity, and multiplicity of meanings in the construction of
environmental risks, benefits, and participation under CREMA/REDD+, and to explore
the making and un-making of governable environmental subjects and how these subjects
negotiate the efforts of subject making.
Farmers’ engagement with agroforestry practices in the CREMA/REDD+ site is
related to overarching ideas about participatory approaches to conservation and
development, market-oriented approaches to conservation, distributive justice (benefit-
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sharing of carbon payments), and specific contextual factors such as tenure and
institutions. In the following paragraphs, I develop the general conceptual and analytical
framework relevant to this dissertation research on the case of CREMA/REDD+
implementation in the Western Region of Ghana. I first provide a brief background on the
emergence of CBNRM strategies, which came out of a long history of efforts to better
govern natural resources by integrating conservation and development agendas around
notions of decentralization. I then argue that REDD+ strategies rework existing elements
of CBNRM for new purposes—mitigating climate change, conserving forests (including
biodiversity), and enhancing livelihoods—and thereby aim to produce forest conservation
stewards. Third, I outline how REDD+ adopts the rhetoric of “social protection” or
“safeguards” —in other words, tools of governance—to address equity issues and
account for past injustices in natural resource governance. Finally, I describe how the
success of these tools of remuneration and punishment are contingent on the local
context, uneven power relations, and multiple subject positions of the farmers, as well as
other relevant actors, all of which may impact the achievement of desired outcomes
through REDD+.
2.2 Community-Based Natural Resource Management
Decentralization has become a dominant paradigm for resource governance both
in rhetoric and in practice. Influenced by participatory and bottom-up perspectives in
development and conservation (Chambers 1995; 1997a; 2005) CBNRM is widely
advocated based on the assumption that such decentralized efforts will result in material
well-being, social justice, promote sustainable management and conservation of natural
resources, and produce overall better resource governance (Child and Dalal-Clayton
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2004; Dressler et al. 2010; Gruber 2010). Community-based approaches to natural
resource management are based on the assumption that local communities have a greater
stake and understanding of local issues than distant actors, and these collaborative
approaches came out of a long history of efforts to integrate the environment and
development agenda (Brosius, Tsing, and Zerner 2005; Shackleton et al. 2002).
The early development agenda, led by the World Bank and other major donors,
treated the environment as a resource base for economic gain. Strategies focused on
targeted nature preservation (e.g., influenced by the first National parks and forests in the
U.S.) while development strategies focused on economic growth and efficiency through
the transfer of technology to boost agricultural productivity and improve infrastructure
development (Richards 1985; Scott and Wilkinson 2011). These centralized, top-down
approaches to rural development have been heavily criticized because they were not
inclusive and left local populations outside of the decision-making processes and
contributed little to poverty alleviation and rural empowerment (Chambers 1997a;
Holling and Meffe 1996; Schmidt-Soltau and Brockington 2007). In response to these
growing criticisms, participatory approaches to development appeared in the 1970s,
evolved during the 1980s, and went to cover Central America, Africa, and Asia
(Participatory Action Research 1991; Chambers 1994, 1997b).
Criticism of top-down development strategies also came in the form of resistance
and protests from communities where many of these projects were implemented.
Communities challenged these command-and-control strategies when their resources
rights were taken away, and they were forced to move to urban areas in search of
livelihood opportunities (Agrawal and Redford 2006; Brockington, Igoe, and Schmidt-
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Soltau 2006). Loss of livelihood and access to the rich-resource base as well as forced
migration fueled conflicts among local communities, state agencies, and other
stakeholders (Schwartzman, Moreira, and Nepstad 2000; McElwee 2010). These tensions
also contributed to the weakening of social structures and loss of natural resources with
minimal improvement in rural livelihoods or strengthening of local institutions
(Chambers 1997a; Schmidt-Soltau and Brockington 2007).
It was also around the same time that the linkages between development and
conservation were strengthened. As a result, the World Conservation Strategy was
formulated and launched in 1980 led by the World Conservation Union (IUCN) with
inputs from other organizations (McCormick 1986). To address the failures of command
and control-styled conservation strategies and to promote sustainable and equitable
natural resource management, conservation practitioners adopted the participatory
approaches for natural resources management including, forest, marine, and other
common resources in Latin America and Africa (Agrawal and Gibson 1999).
Despite the widespread appeal and adoption of community-based and
participatory approaches to natural resource management, they often failed to deliver on
its mandates. The most important of these criticisms are: considering and treating
“project beneficiaries”' as passive recipients of project undertakings (Pimbert and Pretty
1995); the short-term nature of projects and over reliance on outside knowledge and
expertise. Community-based projects also lacked concrete standards to evaluate their
effectiveness in conservation or enhancing human well-being (Kellert et al. 2000). Others
argue how certain social groups are recognized at the expense of sidelining others
(Hobley 1992; Sarin 1995). Elite control of decision-making and elite capture of benefits
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also has been a common outcome of development and decentralization projects
(Dasgupta and Beard 2007; Fritzen 2007). Empirical evidence suggests that decision
making, even in projects implemented in the name of decentralization, is controlled and
dominated by the elites. Elite control can be particularly problematic in societies like
Ghana, where since the colonial period traditional leaders claiming to represent local
interests have had substantial decision-making powers over land management
(Acemoglu, Reed, and Robinson 2013).
As discussed, CBNRM approaches carry both opportunities and uncertainties, but
given their ability to coalesce both environmental and development priorities, these
strategies will remain pivotal parts of the natural resource governance conversation. In
the next section, I demonstrate how REDD+ is a newer form of CBNRM as it has
retained the same elements (objects to be managed, situated subjects such as
communities, goals, objectives, and rationalities) and characteristic of CBNRM
approaches.
2.3 REDD+ as a Reassembled Form of CBNRM
In an extended case of community forest management, Li (2007) demonstrated
how specific practices (described below) might be forged together toward the desired
outcome. In the case of community forest management, the outcomes are related to
material well-being: livelihoods, control, efficiency, sustainability, and conservation
among others. Li identified six practices that apply to any assemblage, described as an
ongoing process of coalescing disparate elements and forging linkages between them.
The practices identified by Li are as follows:
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(1) Forging alignments: the work of linking together the objectives of the
various parties to an assemblage, both those who aspire to govern conduct and
those whose conduct is to be conducted. (2) Rendering technical: extracting
from the messiness of the social world, with all the processes that run through it,
a set of relations that can be formulated as a diagram in which problem (a) plus
intervention (b) will produce (c), a beneficial result. (3) Authorizing knowledge:
specifying the requisite body of knowledge; confirming enabling assumptions;
containing critiques. (4) Managing failures and contradictions: presenting failure
as the outcome of rectifiable deficiencies; smoothing out contradictions so that
they seem superficial rather than fundamental; devising compromises. (5) Antipolitics: reposing political questions as matters of technique; closing down
debate about how and what to govern and the distributive effects of particular
arrangements by reference to expertise; encouraging citizens to engage in debate
while limiting the agenda. (6) Reassembling: grafting on new elements and
reworking old ones; deploying existing discourses to new ends; transposing the
meanings of key terms (Li 2007, 265).
Li’s analysis of assemblage is drawn from the notions of governmentality, a
concept developed by Foucault (1991). Governmentality refers to “governmental
rationality” or the “conduct of conduct,” an idea of government that is not only limited to
the control by states but can be employed by anybody who is interested in governing.
Using governmentality includes various regulatory techniques, some degree of
deliberation to shape our behavior “according to a particular set of norms and for a
variety of ends” (Dean 1999, 10). For Foucault, government, in general terms, means “the
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conduct of conduct” (Foucault 1982) or “…a form of activity aiming to shape, guide or
affect the conduct of some person or persons (Gordon 1991).”
Dean (1999, 10) elaborates this point:
Government is any more or less calculated rational activity, undertaken by a
multiplicity of authorities and agencies, applying a variety of techniques and
forms of knowledge that seeks to shape conduct by working through our desires,
aspirations, interests and beliefs, for definite but shifting ends and with a diverse
set of relatively unpredictable effects, consequences and outcomes.
At the core of this framework lies the notion of problematization, which involves
first examining the thought process in the definition and framing of a problem and second
“how and why certain things (behavior, phenomena, processes) become a problem”
(Foucault 1985a, 115). Two essential features can be identified in the production of
governmental subjects: first, knowledge production to inform the formulation of
problems that need solving, identify priorities and goals, and rationalize forms of
interventions (Dean 1999). Second, the production of subjects involves the creation of
technologies of government, such as institutions and policies, documents, and so on, to
alter people’s conduct (Rose 1999; Li 2007). Both elements are interrelated.
Another important aspect of governmentality is to make the desired conduct
acceptable among the governed such that those considered to be the object of government
consent to be willing subjects. Thus, problem identification must be accompanied by
remedial strategies that direct subjects toward particular conduct, diminishing the barriers
between “problems” and “solutions” (Miller and Rose 2008).
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Extending Foucauldian notions of governmentality to the governance of the
environment, Agrawal’s environmentality examines the results and functions of the
decentralization of environmental governance by analysing “knowledges, politics,
institutions, and subjectivities that come to be linked together with the emergence of the
environment as a domain that requires regulation and protection” (Agrawal 2005). Using
governmentality as a theoretical framework, scholars have examined the mechanics of
environmental policies and identify the rationalities and strategies that are used to
produce and govern neoliberal subjects (Agrawal 2005; Birkenholtz 2009; Bumpus and
Liverman 2011; Li 2007).
REDD+ fits into this literature as a form of environmentality. As Thompson et al.
(2011, 100) noted, “REDD+ is itself an emerging project of environmental governance –a
set of social norms and political assumptions that will steer societies and organizations in
a manner that shapes collective decisions about the use and management of forest
resources.” REDD+ is a process of environmental subject making—of various actors
from professionals working in the projects to local populations to the government, NGOs,
and private actors, all of whom will continually engage in constructing, challenging, and
practicing discourses of conservation and development as shaped by the context of
REDD+ (Agarwal 2004). In that sense, REDD+ is a site where both state and non-state
institutions, actors, policies, and practices meet and are aligned toward a set of goals—“a
transnational apparatus of governmentality” (Ferguson and Gupta 2002).
As REDD+ is piloted around the world, it is reworking existing elements of
CBNRM for new purposes—to bring ecological benefits through reduction of carbon
emissions and biodiversity conservation as well as providing social benefits to local
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communities (Angelsen 2008, 2010). Scholars and experts engaged with the technical
and institutional issues of REDD+ implementation have suggested how REDD+
initiatives can draw lessons from community or collaborative management and forest
conservation (Agrawal and Angelsen 2009; Hayes and Persha 2010; Cronkleton, Pulhin,
and Saigal 2012) and many REDD+ projects have relied on existing community-based
institutions to realizing REDD+ activities on ground. This broad umbrella can be seen as
shaping the goals of CREMAs. CREMAs operate on principles of community forest
management and imply that decentralized resource management efforts through inclusive
local participation can achieve the collaborative management natural resources for
conservation and rural development outcomes.
The piloting of an REDD+ project in the CREMA site also exemplifies how
assemblages such as CBNRM incorporate “new elements onto the assemblage, reworking
existing elements for new purposes and transposing the meanings of key terms” (Li 2007,
284).Therefore, this case of CREMAs and REDD+ at this particular site offers an
opportunity to deploy governmentality to explain forest governance in emerging contexts
of market-based solutions. As demonstrated in Chapters 4 and 5, these practices are
assembled and employed as a means to address issues of deforestation, conservation,
livelihood security, and rural inclusion. At the same time, various interested parties use
these sets of practices to deliver notions of benefits and of improvement in forest
management that help create and enroll responsible and governable environmental
subjects, at least in those sections of the population who are participating in these
initiatives.
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2.4 REDD+ Safeguards As Tools of Government
Governmentality describes a variety of technologies of government, including
policies, practices, and institutional arrangements, for making governable subjects (Dean
1999; Miller and Rose 1990). In the previous section, I discussed how in the context of
CREMA /REDD+, climate change and deforestation is problematized, and ongoing
projects are aimed at governing the conduct of cocoa farmers regarding farming practices
is presented as a solution.
Despite being positioned as an important and potentially cost-effective climate
change mitigation strategy, and having been piloted across the world, REDD+ faces
significant implementation challenges (Eliasch 2008; Palmer and Engel 2009). These
include clarifying land tenure rights, challenges in the quantification of carbon
sequestration, continued demand for food, timber, and biofuels worldwide, permanent
threats of illegal logging and emissions leakage,19 and potential degradation risks in
savannas, wetlands, and tropical forests across borders in countries that are not REDD
participants (Fry 2008; Irland 2008; Olander et al. 2008; Miles and Kapos 2008;
Sandbrook et al. 2010; Karsenty and Ongolo 2012). There are also challenges in ensuring
sustainable market and stable monetary value for carbon credits to ensure the long-term
success of REDD+. For example, high prices for cash crops (including biofuels) can
subvert REDD efforts as in southeast Asia (Butler, Koh, and Ghazoul 2009), as those
prices can result in larger incomes than possible through participation in REDD+
programs. Scholars have also raised concerns about land rights and access claims (Larson
et al. 2013; Resosudarmo et al. 2014; Sunderlin, Larson, and Cronkleton 2009) under
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Refers to a situation that may occur if, due to REDD+ activities, drivers of deforestation shift
from one area to another (locally, nationally, or internationally).
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REDD+. For example, REDD+ projects may fail to recognize customary tenure, use and
property rights to forest resources, undermining the rights of many indigenous local, and
other marginalized groups. Similarly, REDD+ projects can result in the exclusion of
people from resources that they previously had access to or exclusion from project
benefits that may threaten their livelihoods (Luttrell et al. 2013). There may also be
ecological and social consequences of REDD+, such as conversion of natural forests to
plantations or other land uses, threats to biodiversity, displacement of deforestation to
other areas, or recentralize forest governance (Phelps, Webb, and Agrawal 2010;
Sunderlin, Ekaputri, et al. 2014).
REDD+ is entrenched in broader governance structures, as both deforestation and
forest degradation are linked to other global change processes (Biermann et al. 2009;
Rockström et al. 2009). As many have argued, the success of the REDD+ depends on the
alignment of interests of various stakeholders, for under the REDD+ framework, many
forest people will be subject to efforts to make the goals of the political, economic, and
social authorities parts of their livelihood and economic choices (Hiraldo and Tanner
2011; Thompson, Baruah, and Carr 2011). This new configuration of interests will bring
new obligations and duties to the affected communities and their national governments.
However, the failure to align traditional practices and local interests with the REDD+
goals (or vice versa) might lead to outcomes that diverge from project objectives.
The assumption that carbon credits will economically benefit the local
communities and how the ideas about these incentives gain “consent” on the ground
warrants a closer examination. Development is not monolithic, homogenizing, and
depoliticized; it is instead a diverse process and highly contested when particularities of
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specific practices and discourses are examined in the context of various local
organizations (Perreault 2003). It can create alternative paths and spaces for resisting,
negotiating and contesting prevailing knowledge and practices (Bebbington 1996).
Fundamentally, REDD+ efforts require answers to some key questions, including: Given
immediate livelihood and survival concerns directly related to forests, why should
communities care about carbon and conservation? Will the payments for carbon
compensate the opportunity costs associated with surrendering access to forest resources?
What are the assurances, the information, and the coercions involved in legitimizing
REDD+-related development for the communities involved?
As discussed earlier, critiques abound of collaborative resource management
approaches—and because of the past negative outcomes through these approaches—there
is a growing consensus on the importance of “safeguards” or “social protection” to
address inequalities in the governance of forest resources through forest carbon and
REDD+ projects. These social safeguards include but are not limited to the respect for
indigenous and local communities, transparent and effective governance, equity, tenure
security, social benefits, public participation, and the protection of biodiversity
(McDermott, Mahanty, and Schreckenberg 2013; Visseren-Hamakers et al. 2012).
The seven safeguards, agreed to in Cancun in 201020 also known as the UNFCCC
REDD+ safeguards, address the environmental and human rights aspects of REDD+
interventions. They cover policy alignment; transparent and effective forest governance;
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The safeguards are presented in Appendix I, Outcome of the work of the Ad Hoc Working
Group on long-term Cooperative Action under the Convention. In 2010, countries took an
important step when they recognized the role of environmental and social safeguards in
implementing REDD+ projects at the 16th United Nations Framework Convention on Climate
Change (UNFCCC) during COP16 in Cancun, Mexico.
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knowledge and rights of local communities and indigenous people; substantive
participation of relevant local stakeholders (e.g. indigenous people and local
communities); natural forest, biodiversity, environment, and social-co-benefits; address
the risk of reversal of emissions reductions, and reduce displacement of emissions.
Safeguards were designed to alleviate the likely negative impacts of REDD+ projects on
the environment and people. These adverse effects may include displacement of local
populations, loss of resource-based livelihoods, and increased tensions caused by
inequitable distribution of benefits from REDD+ projects. Critically, the purpose of these
social and environmental safeguards is to “do no harm” and attempt to put human
wellbeing at the core of the REDD+ debate. At the same time, these safeguards can
become tools of government for mobilizing and shaping subjects under REDD+
However, the language of safeguards is ambiguous at its best, poorly defined, and
open to interpretation (Arhin 2014; Chhatre et al. 2012). Safeguard activities vary in
terms of how they are defined, funded, or verified. Many multilateral and nongovernmental initiatives supporting REDD+ and sustainable forest management
initiatives, such as the FCPF, draw on the Common Approach and the Strategic
Environmental and Social Assessments (SESA) tool (Common Approach, 2011; SESA,
2009) to ensure that appropriate safeguard measures are taken in REDD+ projects. The
UN-REDD safeguards—the Social and Environmental Principles and Criteria—is for the
readiness activities in countries that have received REDD+ finance
(UNREDD/PB8/2012/V/1). The REDD+ Social and Environmental Standards (SES),
another set of standards is to assist and guide national governments build their structures
and instruments for applying the UNFCCC REDD+ safeguards (REDD+ SES, version 2,
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2012). For instance, for tenure, Principle 1 of these SES safeguards states that “The
REDD+ program recognizes and respects rights to lands, territories, and resources” (pg.
8), while the Cancun safeguards do not mention anything explicitly about tenure issues.
On the other hand, effective participation is emphasized across the existing frameworks
on safeguards.
TABLE 2.1 Key themes and social goals emphasized as safeguards for REDD+
Cancun
Forest
Safeguards Carbon
Partnership
Facility

UN–
REDD
(Mar
2012)

REDD+
SES
(Vers.2)

X

X

Community,
Climate,
and
Biodiversity
Standards
(Vers.2)
X

X

X

Protecting rights of
vulnerable and
marginalized groups
such as indigenous
people
Supporting tenure and
resource rights of
communities
Acquiring free prior
and informed consent
from local and
indigenous
communities
Enhancing livelihoods
Through income
Generation and capacity
Full and effective
Participation of relevant
stakeholders
Sharing of Benefits
Avoided resettlement

X

X

–

X

X

X

X

X

X

–

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

–
–

X
X

X
X

X
X

X
X

Transparent governance
and decision–making
Policies, laws and
regulations
should be consistent
with international and
national

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

X
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policies
Grievance mechanism
to address conflicts and
concerns

–

X

X

X

X

Source: Adapted and modified from Arhin 2014
Note: Cross mark, where expressed (and implied) references have been made to the key
issues highlighted in the left column.

Also, recent empirical evidence (Poudyal et al. 2016) suggests that that
operationalizing safeguard assessments could be challenging and that safeguards often
exacerbate and reproduce existing inequalities (e.g., compensation for REDD+ costs
favored local elites). The study found despite social safeguard assessments; there were
some barriers to equitable benefit distribution, including access to information due to
location barriers; hesitance of communities dependent on shifting agriculture to express
this because of existing government regulations; and dependence on non-representative
local institutions by safeguard evaluators and experts.
Of these key themes and social goals of REDD+ safeguards (Table 2.1), benefit
sharing, tenure security, and effective participation of local communities in management
has been argued to be among the most relevant, as these will enable better forest
outcomes and improved capacity for forest governance (Chhatre et al. 2012). In the next
section, I discuss three of these safeguard themes, “participation,” “tenure security,” and
“sharing of benefits,” and how they can be seen as tools of government. I also discuss
benefit-sharing issues later in Chapter 4.
2.4.1 Participation
Participatory processes can be deployed to improve collaboration and knowledge
exchange between the intervening agencies of REDD+ and project constituents. Many
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indicators and standards for forest governance under REDD+ call for participation of
local people (IUCN 2009; Kishor and Rosenbaum 2003). Through facilitated
participatory processes where there are provisions for information exchange, people can
learn about government services and schemes and know what to expect. In this way,
participation and outreach activities can help gain “consent” of willing subjects of the
REDD+ regime. But deploying the discourses of participation to mobilize people does
not necessarily result in effective participation. Further, choosing interest groups, NGOs,
or customary authorities to implement CBNRM interventions through participatory
processes can weaken governance, as institutional pluralism without accountable
representation can result in the elite capture of participatory practices and the larger
projects to which they belong (Ribot 2002).
Phelps et al. (2010) found that a majority the proposals submitted for “REDD+
readiness” funding from the World Bank did not address governance issues, such as
benefit sharing, insecure tenure and local participation in an effective manner. However,
some proposals adopted the vocabulary of local participation and benefit sharing after
feedback from donors. Such rhetoric on participation cannot depend on just consultations
and mobilization of local people but have to recognize the importance of effective
participation, giving rights and access to forest resources and markets, and building
strong democratic institutions. Effective participation requires the transfer of power to
locally-accountable bodies who represent people’s needs and aspirations, and who will
answer for failures of representation (Ribot 2002). REDD+ must outdo the last three
decades of effort to enhance local well-being and empower those whose livelihoods
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directly depend on forest resources—in attempting to do that REDD has to manage
“failures and contradictions” (Li 2007) to make willing subjects.
For the REDD+ mechanism, however, the real problem is not only about
participation per se, but also about who participates and how (Thompson et al. 2011).
Under current practice, participation and belonging or democracy/representation are
determined by the policy and programmatic decisions made by intervening authorities
like development organizations, government, or NGOs. Effective participation in REDD+
is posited to facilitate several proximate and long-term social co-benefits (Chhatre 2012).
Participation as a social safeguard also stipulates that there has to be a meaningful
representation of local interests and viewpoints in REDD+ decision-making so that local
populations have the voice and opportunities to challenge injustices and inequalities, and
therefore protect their rights. Effective local participation is not only crucial to seek free
and informed consent from the communities for REDD+ projects, but also for asserting
community rights and responsibilities in the initiatives. Participatory processes, therefore,
are a technique of government to enroll the support of specific subjects who seek to
improve their lives through these REDD+ governmental interventions.
2.4.2 Tenure Rights
Harmonizing customary and statutory tenure arrangements has been argued by
many as the first step toward equitable benefit sharing under REDD+. Many have argued
that the unclear and complex land and forest tenure system and the poor governance in
many parts of Africa and Latin America has been identified as hindrances that could
threaten the scope of REDD+ interventions (Cotula and Mayers 2009; Jagger et al. 2009).
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In Ghana, land tenure is a complex issue where it is customary. Customary tenure
implies ownership of land by traditional authorities rather than individual citizens or
communities. Many of these customary tenure arrangements are the remnants of the
formal arrangements established by colonial governments (Amanor and Ubink 2008). In
Ghana, customary tenure is constitutionally recognized and has been institutionally
retained and practiced. This results in traditional authorities being the main institutions
for land and resource management, and hence their wide recognition by intervening
agents, government, and communities. The Constitution of Ghana, however, does not
spell out the specifics of land management by customary authorities, who has the
authority to allocate land rights, and who is entitled the proceeds from such allocations
(Amanor and Ubink 2008).
Both land tenure and tree tenure in Ghana is complex and uncertain. Tree tenure
in Ghana is complicated due to the existence of both official regulations as well as
aspects of customary or traditional tenure systems (Marfo, Acheampong, and OpuniFrimpong 2012). Also, differences in tenure occur between trees that are planted by
farmers and those regenerating naturally, and between trees on family land and those on
communal land. While the statutory framework of Ghana (Act 547) provides secure
tenure for trees planted on farms and forests (plantations), tenure rights over natural
forests and naturally occurring trees (but raised by farmers) remain problematic both in
policy and in practice. Farmers are custodians of naturally regenerated trees growing on
their farms but have no rights to these trees. The management and utilization rights
belong to the state, which assumes this role in trust for the Chiefs or customary authority.
To be able to cut down or utilize the planted trees on their farms, the farmers have to
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obtain permits from District Forestry Services Division (FSD), who have the sole
discretionary power to determine whether permission should be granted. Due to a number
of disincentives associated with tree planting and ability to access benefits (Besley 1995;
Zhang and Aboagye Owiredu 2007), the inability to distinguish between planted trees
and naturally occurring ones (Acheampong 2003), and unclear tenure rights and damage
to crops from logging operations on farms (Marfo 2006,;Hansen, Lund, and Treue 2009),
most farmers in Ghana do not want to plant trees on their farms (Acheampong 2003).
Empirical studies have also shown that farmers often deliberately destroyed trees and
saplings on their farms (Acheampong 2003; Amanor 2000). There is also a lack of
appropriate incentives and tenure based safeguards for tree planting, especially for
migrant farmers who “rent” lands for agriculture (Amanor 1999).
As previously discussed, the REDD+ framework is a form of governmentality
which implicitly relies upon the creation of new environmental subjects to address
anthropogenic climate change. Previous conservation and development projects predating
REDD+ have used tenure rights and property rights as an incentive for particular actions
on the part of participants that might serve to attain a range of environmental
conservation and resource management goals (Hanna and Munasinghe 1995). These
broader goals include reducing poverty, promote economic growth, and encourage
landowners to invest in land and natural resources (Deininger 2003). REDD+ mobilizes
various forms of incentives and punishments, including similar framings of tenure and
property rights, to engage people in agroforestry-related activities. In the next section, we
briefly discuss benefits and sharing of benefits.
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2.4.3 Sharing Of Benefits
REDD+, like other PES programs and projects, results in both risks and benefits
for project stakeholders. In an ideal situation, these costs and benefits of REDD+ are
expected to be distributed and shared across society through benefit distribution systems,
consisting of benefits (described below), actors (including beneficiaries), and rules which
consist of cross-cutting formal and informal rules that govern how benefits are shared
(Peskett, Vickers, and Graham 2011).
Within the prevailing global discourse on REDD+, benefits refer to the incentives
necessary for people’s engagement in the REDD+ projects. Benefits may be proximate
and long term. Benefits may also be material (timber, building material, and cash) and
non-material (e.g., ecosystem services, better governance). Benefit sharing refers to
sharing of benefits among various stakeholders—among countries, within national
programs, and among stakeholders within REDD projects (Figure 2.1). Figure 2.1 shows
the various horizontal and vertical flows of benefits within REDD+ context, also
depicting the intra-household scale to raise the issue of the sharing of benefits among the
individuals within the same households (e.g., among men and women in the same
household). The risks associated with REDD+ refer to environmental, social, and
economic challenges and impacts.
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Figure 2.1 REDD+ and benefit sharing.
Source: Adapted from IUCN 2009

The promise of sharing of benefits through a well-formulated benefit distribution
system is, therefore, another tool of government aimed at attracting farmer participation
in REDD+ project activities and improving their lives. For example, Criterion 12 of the
UN-REDD safeguards aims to “Ensure equitable, non-discriminatory and transparent
benefit sharing among relevant stakeholders with special attention to the most vulnerable
and marginalized groups” to deliver on Principle 3, “to promote sustainable livelihoods
and poverty reduction” (UN-REDD Programme Social and Environmental Principles and
Criteria 2012,). Similarly, Principle 2 of the REDD+ SES states that “the benefits of the
REDD+ program are shared equitably among all relevant rights holders and
stakeholders” while addressing Criteria 1.1 and 1.2, which emphasize the establishment
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of effective,21 equitable,22 and efficient23 benefit-sharing mechanisms (REDD+ SES
[version 2] 2012). These 3-E principles of benefit-sharing mechanisms are expected to
create enabling institutional conditions, distribution of benefits, and ultimately induce a
change in land use practices to achieve the carbon and non-carbon goals of REDD+
projects (Luttrell et al. 2013; McDermott, Mahanty, and Schreckenberg 2013).
It is also important to note that these themes and principles of participation,
tenure, and benefit sharing emphasized by REDD+ as safeguards are not mutually
exclusive, but rather are mutually reinforcing. For example, to ensure an equitable
distribution of REDD+ costs and benefits, clarifying tenure and ensuring inclusion and
participation of relevant stakeholders are seen as important.
2.5 Conclusions
In summary, this chapter shows that (1) CBNRM approaches came out of a long
history of efforts to decentralize resource governance; (2) how REDD+ is reworking
existing elements of CBNRM for new purposes and using “safeguards” as tools of
government to address and account for injustices in natural resource management; (3)
how “safeguards” such as community “participation,” “tenure,” and “benefit sharing” are
challenging to operationalize, and (4) how all of these may impact realization of expected
outcomes through REDD+. In the next chapter, I discuss the methods used in this

21

Effectiveness—the extent to which the emissions reductions and other goals of the program are
achieved.
22

Equitable—Just, impartial, and fair to all parties including marginalized and vulnerable people.

23

Efficiency—achieving the target with minimum cost, effort, and time. All three definitions
proposed by Stern (2008) and broadly adopted under REDD+.
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dissertation to explore the politics of natural resource governance, local development, and
climate change embedded in REDD+ as it takes shape in Ghana.
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CHAPTER 3
RESEARCH METHODOLOGY
3.1 Introduction
In this research project, interviews with implementers, policy makers, and
community participants of a CREMA (pre-REDD) and REDD+ pilot project in the
Western Region of Ghana provided empirical evidence for exploring wider theoretical
questions relating to participation, benefit sharing, and forest governance issues
surrounding REDD+ implementation in Ghana and elsewhere in tropical countries. The
methods and fieldwork for this project were, to a degree, shaped by my engagement with
a larger research and training program called the Responsive Forest Governance Initiative
(RFGI), a five-year initiative focused on environmental governance. This Africa-wide
program conducted a comparative assessment of Reduced Emissions from Deforestation
and Forest Degradation (REDD+) and climate-adaptation interventions in 12 countries in
Africa. The objective of the program was to: ‘enhance and institutionalize widespread
responsive and accountable local governance processes that reduce vulnerability, enhance
local wellbeing, and improve forest management with a special focus on developing
safeguards and guidelines to ensure fair and equitable implementation of REDD+’ (RFGI
2011). Based on a research proposal I submitted, I received funding from the RFGI to
conduct my fieldwork in Ghana.
While there were a set of issues that were of primary interest to the RFGI
program, I had the complete independence to design and implement my research. As a
researcher in the program, I had few time-sensitive deliverables (e.g., mapping the
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forestry related institutions, working papers, and reports) and responsibilities (e.g.,
attending regular country team meetings, regional training, and research workshops).
This also required me to interact with the staff of the Forestry Research Institute of
Ghana (FORIG), which looked after the administrative aspects of the Ghana RFGI
research program.
3.2 Research Setting and Focal Interventions
The Wassa Amenfi district is in the Western Region of Ghana and has forest
reserves covering a total of 413.94 sq. km. These forest reserves constitute 12 percent of
the total landscape and are primarily managed by private logging companies (Sandker et
al. 2010). The land tenure system is based on customary arrangements, but tree tenure is
under state ownership. Among the population of the district, there is a high dependency
on forests for cash and non-cash produce. While cash from forests comes from selling
products such as firewood and non-timber forest products (NTFPs), people also depend
on a variety of forest products for everyday consumption and use (Figure 3.1). The
forests in the landscape have different protection statuses, ranging from protected areas to
production reserves to individual tree plantations. The landscape also includes part of the
only surviving high forests of Ghana. Furi River, Mamiri, and Furi Head are forest
reserves that are part of Globally Significant Biodiversity Areas.24

24

These are among thirty (30) forest reserves in the country which are designated as Globally
Significant Biodiversity Areas (GSBAs) in recognition of their extraordinary biological
importance.
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Figure 3.1 Location of Wassa Amenfi District in the Western Region, Ghana.
Source: Illustrated by author
3.2.1 Specific Research Site
The specific site for the research described in this dissertation was the Bontori
Community Resource Management Area (CREMA) in South-Western Ghana. The
CREMA (pre-REDD) and pro-poor REDD+ pilot project are the two focal interventions
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central to this dissertation because these interventions were about forest governance and
REDD+ (Figure 3.2). The Bontori CREMA, an area of 90 sq. Km, was established by
Agroforestry and Rural Development (ARD), an Accra-based NGO, in 2004. This effort
was supported by a three-year grant from the Small Grants Programme of the Global
Environment Facility. Securing rights for planted trees was one of the main objectives of
the project. Though IUCN did not directly fund the CREMA establishment, it played a
substantial role in its development and formalization and provided technical and financial
support to the CREMA. IUCN’s support for this CREMA aimed first at integrating some
of its Livelihood and Landscape Strategy (LLS) project activities, which was launched in
early 2007, coinciding with the period when GEF funding for the CREMA ended. IUCN
later adopted CREMAs as a critical component of its REDD+ pilot project development
(Nyame et al. 2012), which kicked-off in 2011 (Figure 3.2).

Figure 3.2 Timeline showing the projects at the study site. Source: Illustrated by author
I identified the research site through review of the literature and in particular
through the IUCN website. The IUCN, as part of their ongoing projects, had assessed the
study site in Wassa Amenfi West to understand the forest dependency of the local
population and published some of the initial findings through their website (PROFOR-
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IUCN Poverty-Forest Tool Kit 2010). The study used locally identified poverty indicators
and participatory exercises to collect data on the dimension of forest dependency and
poverty, drivers of deforestation and possible solutions. The pro-poor REDD+ project in
the area organized a number of consultations seeking opportunities to include customary
law and administration into legal options for benefit-sharing arrangements under
REDD+. Initial project activities included awareness generation, transfer of knowledge
and information about REDD+ to grassroots organizations, and the establishment of a
community level pro-poor REDD-plus multi-stakeholder platform. Multi-stakeholder
platforms were designed to engage civil society both at the local and national levels. All
of these factors made this study site relevant to my interests (participation in development
interventions) and those of the RFGI. I describe the research questions that guided this
study in the next section.
3.3 Research Methods
3.3.1 Research Questions
This research examined how discourses of conservation and development were
mobilized and employed as a means to address issues of deforestation, conservation, and
rural development in the case of this CREMA. Specifically, it looked at the
contradictions and gaps between these discourses and the practices they enabled. This
dissertation’s data collection and analysis were shaped around two major research
questions:
(1) Who participates in CREMA/REDD+ activities and why?
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Empirical inquiry for this research question concentrated on the following issues:
(a) community members’ narrative of their engagement with the projects and (b) the
environmental, social, and economic arguments they use to rationalize their participation.
(2) How is that participation achieved?
Empirical inquiry for this research question focused on: (a) how discourses of
conservation and development were employed and promoted as a means to address issues
of deforestation, conservation, livelihood security and rural inclusion, (b) how these
impact how community members evaluated, understood, and anticipated the project
benefits and impacts.
The interview guide and the operational questions related to these central
questions are listed in the Appendices.
3.3.2 IRB and Permissions
Ethical approval for this study was obtained from the Institutional Review Board
of the University of South Carolina-Columbia (April 25, 2012) and the study received an
IRB exempt status. This meant my research was not going to be monitored by the IRB
assuming the project did not change. However, I was still required to fulfill my ethical
obligations regarding transparency and accountability to my study participants, and
therefore made provision for obtaining informed consent. A letter in English and Twi was
handed out and read aloud to inform participants about the purpose of the interviews (see
Appendices). I did not obtain formal written consent from interviewees because the
respondents expressed their consent verbally to participate in the interviews, and because
written consent among a population with such low literacy is not more meaningful than
solid verbal consent efforts.
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Once I received the IRB permission, the team leader of the Ghana RFGI program
wrote a letter of introduction for me and my research, which I then used as an entrée into
the study area. This letter also served as an official permission to research in Ghana.
3.3.3 Living Arrangements and Self-Presentation
I arrived in Ghana on March 25, 2012, and lived in the FORIG guest house in
Kumasi for the first couple of weeks. As a member of the RFGI team, I also had some
research responsibilities and therefore had to be in Kumasi for the first couple of weeks.
During this period, I was primarily reviewing secondary gray literature and publications
that were not available online. I also prepared for fieldwork, interviewing candidates to
serve as my research assistant/interpreter. The Ghana Team leader helped me get in touch
with potential candidates, but it is hard to find someone who was willing to stay and
travel with me for extended periods of time. On the other hand, it was not feasible to find
interpreters closer to the field site because we did not have prior contacts at the study site.
After interviewing two female and one male candidate, I choose a female25 college
graduate with a bachelor’s degree in natural resource management and because of her
prior experience in conducting forestry-related field work.
The first few weeks in Kumasi were also helpful in identifying the key institution
and actors relevant to my research—the Resource Management Support Centre (RMSC)
in Kumasi, the technical wing of Ghana’s FC. Through the point of contacts in RMSC

25

In patriarchal societies, women are often perceived as less threatening and more responsible
than men; colleagues in Ghana advised me against hiring a male RA because they were seen as
troublemakers—getting drunk or involved with local women at the study site, issues with which
they had several prior instances.
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and FORIG, I also received the contact information and names of the high-level actors26
involved in the implementation of the two focal interventions at the study site. I did not
start my formal interviews until I received clearance from the IRB. The Ghana RFGI
team leader gave me the contact information of the IUCN project officer who was based
in Accra. I emailed her, and she told me to come and visit the site in the first week of
April, when the IUCN, in collaboration with the District Administration, was planning a
workshop for the Multi-Stakeholder Platform of REDD+ at the pilot site in Wassa. We
arrived in Asankragwa, the district headquarters of the Wassa Amenfi district on April 3,
2012,27 and spend the next two days observing the proceedings of the workshop. There
were participants from five villages who attended the workshop, which was meant to
share the findings of an earlier Forests-Poverty Toolkit28 assessment conducted by an
NGO, Participatory Development Associates, on behalf of IUCN. This assessment was
also seen by IUCN as a means to improve the design and execution of REDD+ activities
and plans.
Attending the workshop therefore also served another purpose, that is, presenting
myself to the residents of the district and justifying my presence in the area. I introduced
myself as a graduate student from the United States interested in studying forest-related

26

These included IUCN officials, as well as officials with the Forestry Commission, Wildlife
Division, and Arocha-Ghana.
27
I arrived in Kumasi, Ghana on March 23, 2012. The district headquarters of Wassa Amenfi
West is about seven hours’ drive from Accra and six hours from Kumasi. The requirements of my
field research grant required that I collaborate with my colleagues at the Forestry Research
Institute of Ghana, Kumasi and complete the official paperwork.
28

The toolkit is used to collect qualitative and quantitative data on forest dependency and
governance issues. It can estimate wealth ranking based on locally identified indicators (IUCN
2011).
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issues in Ghana. After the workshop had ended, I sat down with the Chairman and the
Secretary of the CREMA. We three were gathered under the shade of a tree, surrounded
by a group of workshop participants from a distance that allowed them to hear fragments
of our conversations without being considered intrusive and disrespectful. The two senior
men were both excited and perplexed with my curiosity in the CREMA and what was
happening in the area. They were also genuinely interested in me and my background,
relentlessly questioning me about my family, my country, and my marital status while
few senior women hollered and teased them. They thought I was “a brave Indian woman”
to have traveled so far to learn about their country and probably had few magic tricks29
up my sleeves, but offered me a place to stay in their respective villages, in case I decided
to pursue my research there.
After spending a week in Asankragwa, we returned to Kumasi on April 11 to
prepare for the extended field work. We returned to the field in the first week of May. I
was based in Asankragwa from May till November, except for the trips to attend RFGIrelated meetings (in Kumasi, Senegal, and Accra), and conduct interviews with policy
makers in other parts of Ghana (Figure 3.3).
3.4 The Data Collection Process
3.4.1 Policy Document Analysis: While a variety of definitions of the term
institution has been suggested, this dissertation will use the term “institution” to indicate

29

A frequent remark that I encountered about my Indian identity and knowing magic.
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the rules,30 norms,31 and strategies32 adopted by individuals operating within or across
organizations. The purpose of the policy document analysis was to understand the
historical, political, and economic basis of the power and functions of the major
institutions that were important for forest governance in Ghana, and for the particular
case in Wassa Amenfi West. In other words, mapping out the key actors, institutions, and
powers helped me understand the context of forest governance in Ghana. I wanted to
situate these institutions in their colonial and postcolonial processes and events that
shaped them, examine the discourses and laws that recognize them and their practices in
forest resource management. I reviewed existing published literature, news articles, and
documents to sketch out the existing institutions in the local arena—elected local
governments, line ministry offices, district officers, customary authorities, project
implementation units, user groups, NGOs, companies and corporations, and political
parties. I searched the Internet for project documents that would outline the roles of the
existing institutions, as well as the specific institutions with which the particular project
was partnering and other key actors related to this project. Information on NGOs and
their projects were readily available, but getting access to government documents was
challenging because digital versions of many of these documents did not exist. At a later
stage, I contacted individuals in the Ghanaian government and the NGOs through email,

‘Shared prescriptions (must, must not, or may) that are mutually understood and predictably
enforced in particular situations by agents responsible for monitoring conduct and for imposing
sanctions’ (Ostrom 2016)
30

‘Shared prescriptions that tend to be enforced by the participants themselves through internally
and externally imposed costs and inducements’. (Ostrom 2010)
31

“Regularized plans that individuals make within the structure of incentives produced by rules,
norms, and expectations of the likely behavior of others in a situation affected by relevant
physical and material conditions”. (Ostrom 2010)
32
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phone calls, and personal visits to gain access to relevant project documents. I later
completed the initial sketch of the existing institutional linkages with information
obtained through direct observation and interviews with actors from the most important
institutions. This exercise helped me understand the institutional terrain relating to forests
resource management in Ghana particularly,


identifying and mapping the context (action, situation, and actors);



identifying the key institutions and their role in the decision-making
process;



the power and accountability relationships of these institutions, which was
not otherwise explicit; for example, situating the role of traditional
authorities in forest governance, land, and tenure issues;



who spoke for whom in matters of forest resource management; for
example, I found out that the elected local governments played a marginal
role in comparison to forestry line-offices; the presence of powerful
private actors;



NGOs and their accountability relationship with the State and the project
constituents.

A complete list of primary policy documents (N = 20) used in this study is
attached in the appendices (Appendix D).
3.4.2 Research Assistants
Language considerations shaped my methods. All villagers except three gave the
interviews in Twi. Some respondents used a number of English phrases and words during
their interviews in Twi. Therefore, I required interpretation to gather information in the
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villages. My interpreters were both females, college graduates with natural and social
sciences backgrounds, and limited exposure to qualitative research. The field site was
new to both of them, and they did not know anyone involved with the project
implementation. One of the challenges I experienced working with these interpreters was
their reluctance to stay in villages for an extended period, which forced me to adjust the
research schedule to address their moods and preferences.
Before data collection, I asked each interpreter to read background materials, a
glossary of terms, and the interview guides. I asked them to clarify the concepts and also
make me aware of any cultural taboos or questions that seemed inappropriate or intrusive.
We continued to reflect on these issues throughout the fieldwork. We did a couple of
pilot interviews to set the time and pace before conducting the actual interviews (Squires
2009). On occasions where I was not allowed to record the actual interviews on my
digital recorder, I recorded the interpreter's translations of these interviews in my field
notes. I also took field notes, daily reflective notes on the physical setting, interaction
patterns, and responses to elicitation materials. While my elementary understanding of
Twi advanced enough to allow me to understand certain phrases and words related to my
central research questions during the later periods of fieldwork, I continued to rely on my
interpreters for detailed translations.
To cross-check the accuracy of the interpretation I was receiving, I played random
excerpts of recorded interviews to two other Twi-speaking team members working at
different research sites. After the first phase of fieldwork, a different research assistant
joined me after the first interpreter had decided to leave to pursue graduate studies in the
UK. I also asked her to translate segments of the interviews conducted during the first
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phase (without listening to the English interpretation) and then we both listened to the
interpretation together to check for inconsistencies as well as similarities. Except for
minor nuances in understanding certain Twi words, the interpretations of the interviews
by the two different research assistants were very consistent.
3.4.3 Interviews
I primarily employed semi-structured interviews to look at the heterogeneity of
meanings in the construction of issues around decentralized forest resource governance
and REDD+. Below, I discuss the rationale for this approach to data collection.
The cohort was divided into two groups according to their role in the
interventions:
(a) Community members at the specific research site
(b) High-level actors consisting of government officials and staff of NGOs
I met all the respondents at least once and more than half of them several times
during my research. Before each set of interviews, I designed an interview guide with
topics and questions that I intended to cover, and for the most part, I was successful in
covering these. However, depending on the responses made by the interviewee, the order
in which the topics were covered and the time spent discussing each topic, differed
significantly. Interviews on an average lasted for about forty-five minutes, the minimum
time was thirty minutes and the maximum was two hours (see Appendices for details).


Community Members
The interviews were conducted between May to December 2012. Originally, I

intended to employ a stratified sampling method that would have included many
combinations of the following identities—native-born versus migrant farmers, gender,
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and relationship to the CREMA and REDD+33(Bryman 2001). Further, I hoped to
represent all the twenty communities within the CREMA. Logistically, the cost and
challenges associated with traveling from one village to another in a rural area and the
volume of interviews the combinations of the identities would generate made this plan
infeasible. Further, preliminary interviews conducted in a few CREMA communities
revealed that the concept is not as well-known as CREMA executives had initially
suggested. So I instead started to focus on people who claimed an association with the
CREMA through membership or knew about the CREMA and planted trees. These
respondents, therefore, were purposively sampled (N = 37) from two settlement clusters
with the CREMA area—one cluster consisting of native-born Wassa communities and
the other cluster consisting of migrants, especially focusing on people who were
knowledgeable about the project and were willing to participate (Figure 3.3). I stayed in
one of the migrant villages for two months and resided near the native-born Wassa cluster
for another three months. Respondents included seven traditional chiefs, one of which is
the divisional chief of Achichire stool.34 Following a loose grounded theory approach
(Glaser and Strauss 2009), I stopped further interviews when I reached a point at which
no new themes or information emerged in the data.

33

All residents of the CREMA did not associate themselves with the CREMA or the pilot
REDD+ activities. Some residents were well aware of these interventions while others were not
interested or were unaware.
34

In the customary land administration the Divisional Chief is the second in rank after the
Paramount Chief. While the Divisional Chief is a Customary Freeholder the Paramount Chief is
the Allodial Owner. Among the Akan, stools are equivalent to thrones, part of the traditional
regalia. In northern parts of Ghana, chiefs use 'skins' as their seat. So 'stools and skins' are often
used to refer to the chief or the area he rules.
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I followed a semi-structured approach and conversational style for the interviews
(in Twi [Akan]/English) to give the participants an opportunity to speak without
restrictions and to allow for new issues to emerge during discussions (Huberman and
Miles 2002a,b). This conversational style of interviewing with the help of an interpreter
helped respondents make sense of the question in light of the respondent’s particular
situation. I usually read a question as worded in my interview guide, then the respondent,
my interpreter, and I would go back and forth to assure that the respondent understood
the question the way it was intended. We did not do this throughout the research process,
as this effort during the initial phase allowed us to standardize and ground the meaning of
our questions.
To put the respondents at ease and give them the freedom to reply in as much
detail as they liked, I started the interviews with an open-ended question on the
respondents’ introduction, occupation, and personal histories. I then moved on to their
awareness, participation in the CREMA, REDD+, ownership, their access and use of
forest resources, the reasons behind their engagement and interest in the conservation and
development activities of this project, and their expectations from this project. In asking
these questions, I used hypothetical questions to gather data on complex or controversial
topics and let the respondents express their thoughts without inhibitions. For example,
participants were usually reluctant to state their mistrust of authorities openly, so I asked
them to imagine a scenario in the future when they may receive some tangible (cash and
others) from the ongoing projects and whom would they trust to oversee the benefitsharing mechanism. I also wanted that the respondents express their real thoughts instead
of what they thought I wanted to hear.
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Silences and nonverbal behavior also add meaning to interviews (Merriam and
Tisdell 2015). Although the spoken word is often the focus of qualitative research, it was
equally important for me to pay attention to what the respondents explicitly did not say or
left unsaid. During each interview, I also observed the non-verbal cues and silences both
in the context of the interview and the topic that we were discussing. Using silences as
data not only added value to the interpretation but also help me think about issues that
were not covered by my questions (Charmaz 2001).
If a respondent permitted, I digitally recorded the interviews while taking detailed
notes. Sometimes, even after agreeing to a tape-recorded interview, I sensed discomfort
and unease in how the participants interacted with me. In those instances, I simply took
notes. There were logistical constraints in recording a few interviews even when
participants agreed to be recorded, such as obtaining adequate batteries for the recorder.
As I learned later through informal interviews and discussions with principal
respondents, I obtained some of the most honest responses to the pressing issues related
to my research when I did not have a recorder or a notebook in hand. People connected
and expressed themselves more openly during everyday conversations. On numerous
occasions, respondents volunteered information off the record. These candid conversation
during day-to-day interactions also helped me assess the validity of interview responses
acquired in a formal setting. After these informal interactions, I would take detailed field
notes and reflections to capture such information where I conversed directly with the
respondents without the help of my interpreter. I also asked my interpreter to maintain a
field diary. While she did not maintain it regularly, we would always have a conversation
at the end of the day about the interviews we carried out that day. According to Suchman
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and Jordan (1990), meaning rests on collaboration. These daily conversations with my
research assistants made me think about what was being said during the interviews to
make sure that my interpreter and me both understand each other and that we were on the
same page. It also helped us refine our questions to simpler and more straightforward
versions.
I believe the election atmosphere influenced some of the responses related to
questions about the representation, performance, and accountability of representatives
and actors of various local institutions. Ghana's general election, to elect the President
and members of parliament, was scheduled on December 7, 2012. The parliamentary and
presidential elections are held every four years. People made statements about the
political parties they supported, and they opposed. Some of the responses indicated that
they were sympathetic in judging the performance of their leaders if they shared the same
political ideals. There were limits to what I could understand through interviews. For
instance, when asked about what happens when things do not fall into place as the project
promised, quite a few referred to their religious beliefs and that the God would take care
of things. “If God permits,” was a common phrase I encountered. Because I do not fully
understand these beliefs, I cannot claim to completely understand the rationales for
people’s observed behaviors and stated beliefs.


High-Level Actors
Following the interviews with the community members, I interviewed eighteen

respondents from different government and non-governmental agencies in November and
December 2012. All interviewees in this cohort spoke fluent English and chose to be
interviewed in English. This included four senior government officials of the FC, five
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NGO officials from three different NGOs, three District Forest officials at the study site,
two District Assembly officials, and four unit committee members. These respondents
were involved with the inception of the CREMA concept, its implementation, and the
oversight of CREMA performance. Some of them, especially the respondents from
NGOs, were involved in the implementation of the pilot REDD+ project in Wassa
Amenfi. Setting up these interviews took some time and effort. Most officials did not
check their emails regularly. I had to call them up repeatedly to schedule interviews and
follow-up. They all had very busy schedules but ultimately agreed to be interviewed. I
did not conduct all the interviews in Wassa Amenfi West. I traveled to Accra, Kumasi,
Takoradi, Damongo, and Mole National Park to interview these policy makers and
government officials (Figure 3.3). All the interviews with the high-level actors were
conducted in their respective offices, except for one respondent who insisted on meeting
at the University of Ghana-Legon campus in Accra.
Interviewing the high-level actors was a challenging but an educating experience.
These sets of interviews required thorough preparation, one of the reasons I decided to
conduct them in the later part of my field work. It was a small sample, but the individual
respondents were irreplaceable because each had the first-hand experience about the
ongoing interventions. I did not ask questions seeking factual information but instead
focused on their perceptions about the focal interventions. All interviewees agreed to be
recorded and spoke for a long time with minimal prompting. I found that high-level
actors either censored their responses or otherwise avoided clear answers when asked
about the controversial topic at the intervention site (e.g., project fund mismanagement). I
also become aware of the unequal power dynamics. For example, during one interview
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with a senior official in the FC, the respondent quizzed me about my knowledge of the
interventions for the first fifteen minutes and in the latter part used phrases such “very
good” or “excellent” to acknowledge my understanding of the nuances of the
intervention. I think his acknowledgment that I had spent time in the field and had a good
grasp of on-the-ground realities helped me get better information about the project
activities from him.

Figure 3.3 Site and samples of interviews. Source: Illustrated by author
3.4.4 Observations
During my research, I had conversations with many people in a variety of
settings. These conversations were not deliberate attempts to gather information about my
research, but efforts to learn about the people I met and their everyday lives. These
observations also helped triangulate the validity of the information I gathered through
interviews with various stakeholders. I have tried to distinguish between the sources of
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information used in this dissertation—those that came out of unstructured interactions
such as above and those that I actively sought through semi-structured interviews.
Although there is no one singular way of conducting participant observation, it is
often seen as an appropriate method to observe, cultivate relationships, and gain entry to
and insights about a study population to gather information relevant to one’s research
questions. Therefore, as Johnson (1975) argues, the practice of participant observation
essentially depends on the researcher’s ability to adjust and deftly adapt to the material
conditions of day to day life. I originally planned to conduct participant observation for
the understanding the breadth and gain deeper insights into the research context.
However, I had to juggle between three different regions interviewing high-level actors,
fulfill my obligations to the RFGI research program, which involved meeting the Ghana
research team in Kumasi every month and three weeks for a mid-term methods workshop
in Senegal. Therefore, participant observation proved to be a challenging endeavor.
Secondly, since participant observation as a method is inherently subjective, I did not
want to lose objectivity as a researcher or become complicit by partaking in forest-related
activities (e.g., collecting NTFPs such as mushroom or snails, herbs, pounding, or
chewing sticks in the forest; collecting firewood; hunting), many of which are declared
illegal by the Forest Department. Lastly, I did not want to present myself as the
tourist/adventurer looking for “exotic local” experiences accompanied by photo
opportunities at the expense of my participant’s time.
Despite not employing participant observation as a formal research method, I
benefitted greatly from my observations and by staying with the community. As I sought
to understand the intervention and peoples' alliance with the project, I also came to learn
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about the many informal processes, the subtle power dynamics and struggles within the
front that were often presented as a “community” to outsiders. This was possible through
observing everyday practices and non-interview-related interacts and living among the
people during my fieldwork. I first visited the village Kamaso, on April 30, 2012, and I
finally moved to a room in the village on May 29, 2012.35 During the initial phases of my
research, various actors involved with the project often discussed its success and the farreaching impacts of the intervention. By living in the area covered by this CREMA, I
later came to understand that these claims were overstated. The numerous informal
interactions and observations on the village durbar grounds, while pounding fufu,36
partaking in making palm oil, and accompanying farmers to their cocoa farms gave me
not only a clearer picture of the general awareness and opinion about the concept of
CREMA and REDD within these communities but also gave me insights about the
entrenched gender-based roles. For example, while making palm oil (Figure 3.4d), or
coconut oil, or kenke37 were identified as income generating activities for women where
CREMA could offer support, these very activities, as many women expressed, among
other factors (multiple roles, primary care givers, lack of time) were a barrier to
participation in larger forest governance issues, because they as women of lower socio-

35

I spent the period from April 19 to April 29, 2012, exclusively in Asankragwa, the district Head
Quarters of Wassa Amenfi West interacting with key actors, understanding the important
institutions and their roles and visiting the CREMA villages. The lag in grant disbursement
delayed the field work; however, after sensing that bureaucratic delays were going to be
inevitable part of the project, I preemptively planned and went ahead with my field work.
36

Staple food in Ghana made by pounding boiled cassava and plantain, and served with meat or
groundnut soups.
37

Fermented cornmeal wrapped in banana leaves served with a stew made of tomatoes and red
pepper.
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economic status, had to prioritize these activities instead of participating in forestry
meetings and forums.
A few actors, who were affiliated with the CREMA,38 volunteered to accompany
me and insisted on being present during the initial interviews. Even though I knew that
their presence could influence the response of my interviewees, I agreed to their presence
in my first two interviews as means of showing my appreciation for their help in the
research. However, I also noted the dynamics of these interactions, including interruption
and non-verbal cues such as facial expressions, body movements, and change in body
orientation during the interviews. For instance, the participants referred me to the
CREMA affiliate when I they were asked about the impact of the CREMA or the office
holders. I also met the same respondents during a later part of my research to clarify
some of their earlier answers. Eventually, as I became more of a regular presence in these
communities, project gatekeepers showed less interest in my work, and I was able to
conduct interviews without their supervision.
Asking about forest dependency was also a challenge. For the most part, people
expressed a nonchalant attitude toward forest and forest resources. However, when I was
living in the village, a person once brought some “game meat” for us.39 When I asked
him about where he caught the animal, he clarified that it was not from the “forest” but
the bush on his farm. At least, in the minds of the community members, “forest” clearly
referred to the reserved forests where hunting or collection of NTFPs is restricted.

38

People who are participating in the CREMA were also the stakeholders in the pilot REDD+
project.
39

It was a common practice to share excess produce; sometimes women, with whom I interacted
on an everyday basis, will ask me to bring “bread” or “soap” whenever I went to the nearby town.
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Therefore, people did not feel comfortable talking about their activities in these areas.
However, few key informants over the course of my stay became more forthcoming
about the issues regarding access to protected forests and forest products. However,
residents of the CREMA had also found other, subtle forms of resistance as a way around
the oppressive and alienating management of forest resources. I could never ask any of
the residents about “illegal logging,” but now and then I would hear the noise of a chainsaw motor joining the orchestrated cacophony of critters in the silence of the village
night. On another occasion, when two drunken men from the village visited us on the
pretext of greeting but stayed on to ramble on for hours about whether we are going to
report their illegal logging activities, the issues about forest resources and how they are
intertwined with everyday lives became much more real.40
Some relevant observations and incidents related to the use of natural resources
and forest products, excluding the above examples include:


Observing and talking with my next door neighbors while they prepared
“game” meat and expressed concern about the declining availability of
animals and forest produce.



A child is showing me his pet bird and telling me that he and his father
found it in the forest during a hunting trip.



Breaking cocoa pods while talking to cocoa farmers in their farms and
accompanying them to the forest reserve boundary to see the paths they
take to collect NTFPs.

40

I still struggle to comprehend this particular interaction, whether it was a veiled threat, a
resistance to my presence as an outsider or a genuine concern on part of those two men about
their sources of income; I never got a chance to interact with those two again, they were always
traveling.
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Observing firewood and charcoal being sold in local markets and buying
and using charcoal to cook our food in the village



Observing village women carrying dead and fresh cut firewood in their
baskets while they come back from their farms.



Observing and talking to a herbalist, while he made medicines from dried
wild herbs collected from the forest reserve.



Talking with intoxicated key participants multiple times while they
voluntarily admitted that bush meat was way “sweeter” and I should try
some of it.



Observing tree stumps covered with plant matter in a farm close to the
village; it is illegal to cut naturally occurring timber trees even outside
protected reserve areas.

Figure 3.4 Non-timber forest products. (a) Small game animals, (b) crabs, (c)
mushrooms, and (d) making household items such as wooden pounding sticks and
mortar; some of these are also available in people’s farms.
Source: Author
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These observations, interview data, day-to-day interactions, and published reports
gave me an in-depth understanding of natural resource use and management in the
villages in the cocoa landscape of Western Ghana
3.5 Approaches to Data Analysis
3.5.1 Data Organization and Preparation
The audio files and interview notes were first categorized into high-level actors
(government officials, NGO officials) and community respondents. These were further
classified into subcategories and assigned abbreviated names using the scheme described
in Appendix 1. The description of the classification scheme, demographic information,
and duration of each interview was maintained in a separate file MS Excel file. So a
transcribed interview file name was named as NGO1Male. I transcribed 60 percent of the
interviews using Dragon Dictate, and the rest were transcribed using Done It Now
transcription service. The service provider signed a Non-Disclosure Agreement with me
and was provided with a list of key words. I checked for consistency and accuracy by
going through the transcriptions several times, transcribing inaudible portions myself, and
randomly cross checked the audio files using the time-stamps as reference points.
3.5.2 Framework for Analysis
An explanatory framework was used to structure, label, and define the data. The
analysis of the primary and secondary data was organized around the topics that relate
directly to the primary research questions discussed at the beginning of this chapter:
1. Participation: Semi-structured interviews were evaluated according to (a) the
respondents’ self-declaration of membership and their description of activities (e.g.,
farming, member of CREMA, planted trees in their farms, had attended ended meeting on
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CREMA and REDD+); (b) their explanations of the rationales for participation in the
activities; and (c) their knowledge about the focal interventions.
2. Dominant discourses: For this element of the research, both secondary kinds of
literature (policy documents) and interviews were assessed according to (a) policy
narratives of environmental risks related to deforestation and forest degradation; (b)
descriptions and evaluations of policy and project guidelines to address those risks; (c)
respondent’s views on environmental crisis; and (d) evaluations of the meanings and
rationales project participants attached to themselves as individuals and a community to
mitigate those risks.
3. Benefit sharing and equity issues: For this component of the research, both
secondary kinds of literature (policy documents) and interviews groups were examined
according to (a) respondents’ perception of current benefits from trees and forests for
their livelihoods; (b) policy discourses on forest resource benefits sharing; (b)
respondent’s views and perceptions on project benefits; and (d) how respondents
perceived and evaluated various actors and institutions in forest resource governance and
their role in benefit sharing.
3.5.3 Coding
This “first cycle coding” has also been called “open coding” or “initial coding” by
other theorists (Charmaz 2006; Glaser and Strauss 2009; Saldana 2015). Structural
coding is question driven and involved assigning a code to a set of questions and probes
that comprised evaluative criteria as described previously. I used a qualitative data
analysis software, MAXQDA, for coding the data. The transcribed interviews were saved
inside these projects as “files.” For instance, if the transcription was an interview with an
NGO official, the file is named as NGO1Male. Each file was then accompanied by a
70

memo that had additional details on the interview, including location, duration, and
institutional affiliation. For the initial round of in vivo coding, I used the “Lexical Search”
function in MAXQDA and auto coded the search results. I then read the “retrieved
segments,” examining if the keywords appeared in context and used structural codes41 to
filter and extract relevant portions of the data to answer specific topics. After rereading
and re-coding the data several times, I proceeded to develop categories. I combined codes
according to their similarity, linkages, and the regularity in which they seem to appear in
response to the topic and context.
During the coding process, I also assigned a memo to codes and categories
detailing the assigned words and phrases that captured the essence in the context of the
issues. I also used the memo function to mark the “contextual meanings” of advanced
codes to revisit in the subsequent cycle of coding and analysis. These memos in the
software helped to develop a “code book.”
Here is an example showing my initial coding scheme in MAXQDA (Figure 3.5):

Figure 3.5 Screen shot of the MAXQDA interface showing the
initial codes. Source: Author
41

I had a draft structure of the code system that I imported to MAXQDA; however, this was
modified as the project proceeded and new codes emerged.
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3.5.4 Thematic Analysis
Bernard (2006) succinctly states that analysis “is the search for patterns in data
and for ideas that help explain why those patterns are there in the first place.” As
discussed in the previous section, through several cycles of coding and recoding, I
identified words/phrases that the participants used frequently, as well as ideas that
emerged from how the interviewees narrated their involvement in the projects and the
stories that they told me. After organizing these codes into categories, I started to look for
patterns, associations, concepts, and explanations to make sense of the categories and
arrive at important themes.
Here is an example showing how I used coding to derive meaning out of my
interview data:
Main Research Question: Why do people participate in the interventions?
Selected Operational Questions:
Have you heard about the CREMA? What is it?
Are you a member?
Tell how you got involved with CREMA?
What activities do you do as part of the CREMA? Why?
The responses (raw data), the codes, and the categories in response to the
operational questions listed above can be seen in Table 3.1.
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Table 3.1 Linkage between raw data, codes, categories, and themes related to the topic of
participation in CREMA
Responden
t Identifier

Raw Data

Interview
No. 21,
Male ,
Kamaso,
date

“My main
motivatio
n for
joining
CREMA
is to plant
trees to
replace
the cut
down
trees so
that the
excessive
heat and
irregular
rainfall
can be
reduced
and it will
benefit
not just
Ghana but
the whole
world”
“To have
future
benefits
from trees
as I
cannot go
into the
forest;
Nontimber
forest
products”

Interview
No. 41,
Male ,
Kamaso,
Date

SubCode (in
vivo
codes)
“Tree
planting”
Excessiv
e heat
Irregular
rainfall
Benefit

Trees,
NTFPs
future
benefits,

Parent Code

Category

Discourses
about the
environment

Participation

“Afforestation
”

Risks

Ecosystem
services as
benefits

Responsibilit
y (toward self
and others)

Benefits

Participation

“Afforestation
”

Non-cash
benefits

Access issues
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Themes

Participation
hinged on
anticipated
benefits
Environmenta
l issues that
needs to be
solved

Participation
hinged on
anticipated
benefits
For securing
the future

One of the important categories that emerge from the above data is about
participation in the CREMA through tree planting. Another role of tree planting is to
address environmental problems and for benefits.
The above data appear to suggest that people engage in tree planting and
agroforestry promoted by the CREMA/REDD+ because tree planting was perceived by
the project constituents as a solution
-

to address environmental issues;

-

experts told them about the importance of tree planting;

-

to secure the future of both individual and the society.

I summarized my findings and themes and revisited literature to compare my
findings and find possible explanations for them. I explore the major themes in the results
chapters.
3.6 Assumptions and Limitations
Inter-cultural perceptions, the intermingling of identities, and my position
influenced the fieldwork process and the information that I received. As an “outsider,” I
could always manipulate my position as someone who is in the field to learn (Bernard
2000) by inquiring, questioning, and not taking the obvious at face value, often because I
did not understand specific things in the way that an “insider” does. However, the
dichotomy that is assumed to exist between insider knowledge and status versus outsider
knowledge and status is not as established (Herod 1999). Therefore we cannot
presuppose that an insider will necessarily produce more relevant knowledge t compared
to an outsider simply because of their insider status. For instance, participants in the
study were willing to give me more time during the interviews, citing I was a “foreigner,”
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“had more access to the outside world,” and can “communicate their issues” better. While
conducting fieldwork in a foreign country, I embodied multiple identities. The meanings
of my characteristics, particularly my gender and race, to my informants were beyond my
control or direction, and the connotations that those attributes send out varied with each
respondent that I interviewed; at the same time, the identities of my informants were also
as fluid and diverse as that of my own.
To address the biases associated with qualitative data and improve the validity of
my findings I used triangulation (Creswell and Miller 2000; Denzin 1973; Rossman and
Wilson 1985), a common method among qualitative researchers. I reviewed archival and
contemporary secondary literature, experiences from observation, and information from
my interviews and informal conversations with community members. One of the more
surprising findings was how much of the traditional cultural norms actually dictated
resource governance in rural Wassa Amenfi, and the popular view about the Chiefs’
powers centered on claims of “autochthony” and “traditional” in contrast to majority of
texts that attributed the power of traditional rulers to colonial policies, and patronage
relationships chiefs had with the postcolonial Ghanaian State. This finding allowed for a
more nuanced examination and analysis of participation, representation, and
accountability issues in the focal interventions. To establish the credibility and reliability
of my research, I also conducted member checking of my research to see if they
understood the preliminary interpretations of their interviews and the meanings contained
in them. I also conducted source triangulation, by looking at the themes in the responses
to check if my informants shared a common understanding surrounding forest
governance issues. Investigator triangulation was also carried out after the preliminary
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coding of interview data, particularly in the first few levels of coding hierarchy. Review42
by colleagues at various stages of the research process, sharing findings with the country
team as well as during one mid-term research methods meeting and a terminal results of
research meeting also helped establish the credibility of the findings to a certain extent
(RFGI Bulletin 2012, 2014).
3.7 Conclusions
This research project utilized qualitative research methods using a case study
design principle to elicit data through semi-structured interviews. I also used
complimentary qualitative methods, including informal conversations, observations, field
notes, secondary data collection from the Internet, government, and NGO sources. The
highly contextual and subjective explanations of cocoa farmers’ participation in
agroforestry activities in Ghana’s Western Region as part of the focal interventions
required the use of qualitative techniques, to produce substantive and deliberated
arguments. All of these issues are discussed in the subsequent Chapters 4, 5, and 6, which
use the interview transcripts and analysis of policy documents to understand (1) Who
participates in CREMA/REDD+ activities and why? (2) How was that participation
achieved?
In the following chapter (Chapter 4), I show how participation in agroforestryrelated activities hinged on the anticipated benefits, both short-term and long-term from
the interventions. I lay out how people saw the need to protect the environment and
embedded their own experiences within the environmental crisis and climate change
narratives while justifying their engagement with agroforestry projects.

42

This research being part of ten nation Africa wide project involving thirty researchers.
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CHAPTER 4
WHOSE LAND AND WHOSE TREES? FARMERS’ PERSPECTIVES ON
PARTICIPATION IN CARBON AGROFORESTRY AMIDST TENURE
INSECURITY
4.1 Introduction
At the time when fieldwork for this dissertation research was carried out in 2012,
IUCN was implementing Phase I of the pro-poor REDD+ project43 in Wassa Amenfi
West. The project was funded by the Danish International Development Agency
(DANIDA). The primary project activities were awareness generation about REDD+,
capacity building (e.g., improving governance, institutional capacity, management of
forest resources, developing a monitoring, reporting, and verifying framework), and
stakeholder consultations about benefit sharing and communication activities (REDD
Full Proposal 2008). As part of the REDD+ readiness phase, these activities were
consistent with Ghana’s efforts at the national level, which included preparing the
Readiness Grant, designing REDD+ Readiness management strategies, and launching
seven REDD+ pilot projects44 for implementation (Ghana FCPF REDD Readiness
Progress Sheet 2012).
Ghana’s Readiness activities at the National level were primarily a response to
World Bank’s Forest Carbon Partnership Facility, launched around 2008. The

43

IUCN’s pro-poor REDD project covered national REDD readiness processes in five forest
countries (Cameroon, Ghana, Guatemala, Uganda, and Papua Province of Indonesia). Phase 1 of
the project ran from 2009 to 2013. Phase 2 of the project started in 2014 and will end in 2018.
Both the phases were funded by DANIDA.
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simultaneous national and sub-national (piloting) implementation of REDD+, supported
by different donor funding, exemplifies Ghana’s adoption of a nested approach to
REDD+ (also explained in Chapters 1 and 2).
In 2012, early REDD+ piloting and demonstration activities were implemented by
various non-state actors such as NGOs, communities, and private forestry enterprises
supervised by the Ghana FC. The seven pilot sites for these activities were located in the
HFZs and transitional ecological zones, which are the southern and central part of the
country. The individual project-based piloting strategy changed in 2015 when Ghana
opted for a landscape approach to piloting REDD+ and included representative
landscapes from all three ecological zones of Ghana—HFZ, transitional ecological zones,
and Northern Savannah zone (Isyaku, Arhin, and Asiyanbi 2017).
This chapter addresses the first research question: Who participates in
CREMA/REDD+ activities and why? While addressing the first research question by
focusing on the participation of farmers in the CREMA/REDD+ intervention, this chapter
briefly describes land and tree tenure arrangements in Ghana to present these
CREMA/REDD+ projects in broader context. The chapter then shows how farmers’
involvement with past conservation and development initiatives in the area helps them act
as particular kinds of environmental subjects legible to and manageable by REDD+
interventions. The next section elaborates cocoa farmers’ perspectives on participation in
agroforestry and explores the following interrelated themes: perceptions about the
CREMA and REDD+ projects, rationales and motivations for participation in the project
activities, participant views of overlapping existing and future practices related to
farming, conservation, agroforestry, and conservation. In this chapter, I also show how
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the diverse responses of the project participants toward CREMA/REDD+ cannot be
separated from their extensive prior engagement with earlier development interventions.
4.1.1 Land and Tree Tenure in Ghana
The underlying argument of this dissertation is that participation under
CREMA/REDD+ produces environmental subjects (Agrawal 2005). Through empirical
data from the field, I extend the discussion of how project rationalities are
internationalized by those who “participate” in their beliefs and practices. Both the
CREMA and the REDD+ pilot initiatives seek to improve forest outcomes by instituting
behavior change in cocoa-farmers through efforts to coalesce their support for climate
change mitigation, forest conservation, and material benefits. This involves bringing
together the goals of various parties interested in various activities and outcomes of
REDD+, but doing so in an insecure land and tree tenure context. While clarifying tenure
issues has been identified as the key challenge in setting up REDD+ on the ground
(Sunderlin et al. 2014), empirical evidence has shown that disjointed land tenure
interventions at the local level are insufficient to address tenure issues and therefore
REDD+ needs broader tenure reforms to address equity issues and improve outcomes
(Larson et al. 2013).
Early approaches to land tenure administrative reform under structural adjustment
promoted by the World Bank and other donors focused on promoting land titling and
registration (Bruce, Shem, and Atherton 1994; K. Deininger and Feder 2001; Feder and
Noronha 1987; Lipton 1993). Although research sponsored by the World Bank found no
direct correlation between titles to land and long-term investment in land (Bruce, Shem,
and Atherton 1994), REDD+ and forest restoration initiatives have seen a resurgence of
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these tenure reform efforts (Cotula and Mayers 2009). The World Bank study instead
recommended “community-based” solutions that would decentralize land administration
to communities (Amanor 2008), an approach embodied in CREMAs.
Land and tree tenure in Ghana is complex and uncertain due to the co-existence of
official legislation/regulation and traditional or customary tenure systems (Marfo et al.
2012). Traditional or customary tenure systems in particular lead to various assertions of
proprietorship and rights over land resources based on lineage, levels of authority, use
and occupancy (Kasanga, Kotey, and others 2001; Unruh 2008). Over 90% of land in
Ghana is controlled by traditional customary tenure systems, where land is owned by
stools/traditional owners/families, but NTFPs such as trees and animals are vested in the
state. Due to this complex land tenure systems, sharecropping arrangements between land
owners and tenant farmers are common in the cocoa landscape. These sharecropping
systems first emerged around the creation of cocoa plantations and their subsequent
management (Hill 1956) and can be categorized into two main groups: Abunu and Abusa.
In the Abunu share cropping system, cocoa production is shared on a 50/50 basis
between the landowner and the tenant farmer. Under an Abunu contract, the tenant farmer
is responsible for establishing the cocoa farm by clearing the land, performing all farm
tasks, and making decisions regarding the processing and selling of the cocoa beans.
During the first two or three years before the cocoa trees reach maturity and produce a
crop, the tenant farmer has no rights to any revenue other than the right to the food crops
that he grows on the land. When the cocoa trees reach maturity and produce a crop, the
income from cocoa sales is divided between landowners and the tenant. In a variant of the
Abunu system, the usufruct right to half of the cultivated farm land is given to the tenant
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after the cocoa crop matures, and the tenant becomes the de facto45 owner of one-half of
the plantation.
Under the Abusa system, the migrant (or caretaker) farmer farms on established
older cocoa farm/land and performs farm-related tasks such as spraying, weeding, and
harvesting (Hill 1956). In general, the landowner lives close by and oversees the
migrant's work. At times the landowner might provide housing to the migrant farmer.
However, decisions regarding harvesting, selling, and other financial matters are solely
taken by the landowner. The caretaker farmer usually receives one-third of the total
earned money from selling the cocoa that was produced (Knudsen and Fold 2011).
Also, differences in tenure occur between trees that are planted by farmers and
those regenerating naturally, and between trees on family land and those on communal
land. While the legislative framework of Ghana (Act 547) offers tenure security for trees
planted on farms lands and forests (plantations), tenure rights over forests and naturally
regenerating trees remain challenging both in law and in practice. Ghana has four main
tree-tenure contexts (Table 4.1).
Table 4.1 Tree tenure contexts in Ghana
Type of land
Production forest
reserves

Tree tenure
State has control and manages, as a trustee, the forest reserve
lands and the trees occurring thereon on behalf of the stools and
landowners;
FC manages, approves timber contracts to harvest and market
timber, sets standard and guidelines; regulates the timber supply
chain in the reserves; Benefit-sharing schemes exists

Protection forest
reserves
Off-reserve
areas—mainly
45

State has control
Natural trees are ownned by those who own the land on which
the trees occur, but most lands in Ghana are stool land; FC still

The tenant farmer usually do not have land titles and the agreement between the land.
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trees on
farms/family land

has the mandate to regulate the utilization of forest and timber
resources;

One who plants owns the planted trees but needs registration
certification to prove ownership
Community forests Different schemes have various combinations of ownership,
(under the forest
control, management, and usage rights
law) or (under the
wildlife law)

The coexistence of these different tenure systems greatly complicates REDD+
efforts. Individual ownership of planted trees and usage rights may lead to better income
for farmers, but existing land and tree tenure systems as described above may
compromise the expected benefits from tree tenure privatization. Even though the legal
framework of Ghana offers tenure security for planted trees, the individual farmer has to
negotiate the benefit-sharing arrangements with the land-owner based on their existing
share cropping arrangements. The presence of legal provisions for planted trees does not
resolve uncertainty in tree tenure because land tenure as discussed above is complex and
insecure. Despite these opaque tenure arrangements, farmers in the study area engage
with the CREMA/REDD+ and therefore makes an interesting case to examine.
4.2 Prior Engagement with Conservation and Development Interventions Shapes
Participation
Farmers in the Bontori CREMA have been exposed to conservation and
agroforestry activities through previous projects implemented both by government line
offices (e.g., FSD, WD, and Agricultural Department), and environmental NGOs such as
the IUCN, Care International, and Agriculture and Rural Development.46 Villagers in the
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The name of the local NGO has been changed to avoid its identification.
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area had participated in training programs organized by these agencies for capacity
development and awareness generation related to conservation issues.
In 1994, as part of a government program on plantation establishment and
development, a progressive farmer47 in the area established a teak plantation. Samartex, a
leading timber company, helped the farmer by supplying seedlings, and later by
providing learning opportunities through workshops, training, and technical advice. The
farmer recalled how he became involved in agroforestry.
We were taught to expand the afforestation to include other species like
mahogany, and teak. Then in 2000, we received a national award during the
Forestry Week. That was last the Forestry Week celebration we had in Ghana.
There we were advised to try agroforestry. So we started the agroforestry in 2000,
whereby we inter-planted timber species with fruits, cocoa, cola, and coconut;
advice came from Forestry, Samartex, and other stakeholders like the Agric
Centre. Moreover, the Agric Centre had the program in Wassa Amenfi. They
doubted the yield of cocoa and cola, and so they wanted to know how other
species worked with cocoa, if we supplied the cola from cocoa, whether we can
mix coconut with cocoa. So you see, we had to know it, so we started from that
experiment. We started with coconut and cocoa, with cola. That was the
preliminary stage. In 2005, we were connected to FORIG by Samartex
Company.48
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This term was used by the respondents. This term, influenced by paradigms of modernization
theory, refers to agricultural or commercial entrepreneurs capable of earning money and adopting
new technology, and therefore belonging to a higher class elite whose adoption of new
technologies would eventually trickle down to the peasantry (Amanor and Ubink 2008).
48

Interview No. 37; Male, Pebase December 15, 2012.
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For several years since then, some cocoa farmers in the area planted trees on their
farms, sometimes with assistance from Samartex, who harvested and brought their farmgrown timber. In 2004, this small group of farmers joined to form the Bontori CREMA,
primarily focused on tree planting. The formalization of the CREMA happened later, and
more people became part of the CREMA by either pledging to plant trees on their farms
or by planting trees. Another NGO, Care International, supplied tree seedlings to about
fifty members of the CREMA.
In 2004, a grant from the Small Grants Programme of the Global Environment
Facility was given to a local NGO, ARD, to further the CREMA activities. The main
activities supported by the grant involved the capacity building of farmers for
biodiversity conservation and enhancing livelihood security. In 2007, at the end of the
three-year project, fifty farmers in five CREMA communities had received training on
tree nursery establishment and seedling/sapling production, administrative and financial
management, and organic farming. The project also supported the establishment of five
community tree nurseries managed by select community members. The project also
reported production of 22,000 seedlings in the nurseries and the rehabilitation of 200
hectares of degraded land within the CREMA through the planting of indigenous tree
species. In addition to these measurable outputs, another significant achievement of
CREMA stakeholders (NGOs, CREMA members, and donors) was to work toward
clarifying the tenure of planted trees (SGP-UNDP 2012).
Farmers in Ghana were not always amenable to the idea of having trees on farms.
Until recently, formal policies, regulations, and laws did not give farmers any rights over
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trees with economic value that naturally grew on their farms.49 To distinguish between
planted and naturally occurring trees, the Ghanaian state mandates the registration of
planted trees on farms. However, more than seventy percent of the respondents in my
study were either not aware of this option or found it troublesome to get their trees
registered. Farmers deliberately destroyed natural trees(not planted), fearing outsiders
harvesting trees would destroy crops on farms without compensating for loss, or sharing
benefits from the harvested timber (Acheampong 2003). Other reasons for not wanting
trees on farms were the perception that trees competed with cocoa, brought crop diseases,
or were troublesome to manage (e.g., cleaning weeds in the initial years, watering). In
this context, the idea of CREMA (decentralized resource management, benefits, and
property rights over planted trees, advisory and extension services) brought together the
political, economic, and environmental interests of a select group of farmers, the group
who agreed with the ideas behind CREMAs and adopted agroforestry practices.
Another intervention was IUCN’s Livelihoods and Landscapes Strategy, launched
in the area in 2007. The LLS was implemented by IUCN in twenty-seven landscapes
across Africa, Asia, and Latin America and was funded by DGIS (Ministry of Foreign
Affairs of the Netherlands). The initiative ran from 2007 to 2011. The objectives of LLS
were fourfold. The first theme was poverty reduction; second was to support natural
resource-based markets and incentives; third was to work toward improved forest
governance that includes forest resource rights and secure tenure; and fourth was to
enable landscape transformation by effective policy guidance and restoration forest
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Ghana is considering legislative reforms for clarifying tree tenure and implementing benefit
sharing schemes.
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landscapes (IUCN 2012—Livelihoods and Landscapes Strategy: Results and Reflections.
Gland, Switzerland: IUCN)
Ghana was one of the twenty-three countries where the LLS was implemented.
The LLS activities in the country were carried out in the Ashanti and Western Regions
and focused on clarifying ownership rights about trees. By supporting a registration and
certification process for planting trees, LLS incentivized the farmers to plant trees on
their farms. IUCN worked with the members of the Bontori CREMA through a variety of
strategies including intercropping cocoa with Allanblackia trees.50 IUCN is also
establishing a dialogue to discuss benefit-sharing mechanisms for REDD+ through multistakeholder platforms and contributing to national forest and landscape restoration
strategies (Crockett 2015; IUCN 2016). After the IUCN LLS project ended in 2011, the
pro-poor REDD+ pilot was launched. As with the LLS, IUCN again adopted the existing
CREMA as a critical component of its REDD+ pilot project development (Nyame et al.
2012). The main objective of this pro-poor REDD+ project was to generate awareness,
build stakeholder capacity, and conduct stakeholder consultations with the goal of
clarifying tree tenure rights and design benefit-sharing mechanisms.
Therefore, continuous engagement with the agroforestry-related issues through
the CREMA shaped local perceptions about the pro-poor REDD+ project. Explaining
how engagement with CREMA has enhanced participation in REDD+, one community
leader said, “For example, when the REDD concept came in, and we educated our
members on the REDD program, many farmers have joined hands in planting the
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An indigenous species of tropical Africa whose seeds are used to produce vegetable oil and
margarine that remains stable in room temperatures and has health benefits.

86

agroforest. So, by so doing the CREMA has been a role model for the community and
trees are being planted abundantly.”51
The context-specific interventions described above are examples of a wide
range of initiatives seen across Ghana working toward these same goals. These
interventions include efforts to address forest loss and degradation in Ghana through
global and national programs such as the Ghana—EU Voluntary Partnership Agreement
under the Forest Law Enforcement, Governance, and Trade Initiative; the FSC Forest
Certification Programme; the Natural Resources and Environmental Governance
Programme; and various plantation development programs.
Involving local people in the development and enforcement of local regulations is
central to the creation of environmental subjects (Agrawal 2005; Agrawal et al. 2005).
Agrawal’s research in India finds that villagers who engage in forest council activities,
forest monitoring, and environmental conservation are those who understand the need to
protect forests in the manner framed by those who bring conservation to the community
as an issue and are most likely to protect the forests. Similarly, in the CREMA villagers
displayed their concern for forest conservation and the environment, which is likely
attributable to their long-standing engagement with forestry management. For example,
as the wife of a traditional leader in the area said,
“The soil is not good anymore. When we planted vegetable before we did not
need fertilizers, but now we use it for our vegetables. At first, rainfall used to be
so heavy that we did not even go to our farms, but now the rainfall is OK. Since
the past five years, everybody has started using fertilizers and pesticides in cocoa
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Interview No. 18; Male, Essandokrom, July 5, 2012.
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farms; we were initially scared about using those thinking it would kill the plants,
but now everybody uses it since it increases productivity.”52
Respondents demonstrated how they had internalized the conservation discourse
and used its language to represent themselves as responsible subjects who understand the
importance of tree planting, the environmental services that trees provide, and that they
were able to incorporate this mentality to regulate their farming practices through
agroforestry. For example, one CREMA member who worked as a voluntary forest guard
narrated how his youngest son lost an arm while playing with the gun he had kept for
scaring poachers and illegal loggers. On another occasion, I witnessed two villagers stop
a truck and check it for smuggled wood. Along with serving as voluntary forest guards,
many CREMA members regularly monitored the area and reported illegal logging
incidents to the district forest officials, thus assisting in the enforcement of local
regulations on forests.
The CREMA stakeholders frequently positioned themselves as pro-environment
by claiming that the Bontori CREMA, unlike the other CREMAs in different parts of
Ghana, was initiated by the community. The following quote illustrates this claim, “… all
such CREMAs were founded by the WD, but this CREMA is self-initiated CREMA,
community initiated CREMA.’53 This “community-initiated” claim about the Bontori
CREMA was made by not only by most of its members but also by policy makers.
Those who claim to be CREMA members also frequently state their roles and
responsibilities in forest management: they regularly patrol the nearby protected forest
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Interview No. 10; Female, Kamaso, June 15, 2012.
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Interview No. 22; Male, Kamaso, May 31, 2012.
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reserves, monitor villagers’ activities, and enforce village regulations. They also describe
the challenges related to enforcing these forest regulations, such as managing the “bad
nuts” within their community and the lack of remuneration for doing their jobs. They
understand that “educating” communities on environmental issues is essential to enable
them to conduct themselves in compliance with conservation values. They employ the
same rhetoric as the conservation staff on the importance of giving rewards or alternative
livelihoods to induce people to support conservation efforts. For instance, a CREMA
member listed a number of positive impacts that the CREMA brings to the farmers:
First and foremost the CREMA is to bring the farmers of the community together
for their strength and unity. Secondly, to manage and tap the resources within the
community for the betterment of the farmers. Third, we are to plant trees and
guard the forests to promote the ecosystem and four we are to come together for
all the NTFPs of the forest sustainably, rear small ruminant animals and the bees
in a sustainable livelihood of the people between the community and the CREMA
as a whole. …Formerly when the CREMA hasn’t come to exist the forest was
being poached by hunters every now and then you will be hearing “gim-gim”—
it’s the noise of the guns killing animals, you but when the CREMA came and the
laws abiding the CREMA and forbidding then hunters to poach, anyway there is a
bad nut (those who break the law) in every society but the hunters do not poach
too much these days … those economic trees, they usually prune by themselves
… so the pressure from getting wood logs from the forests also has decreased
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tremendously because the women can now get it from anywhere in their farms
and they cease to go into the forest.54
Given the pro-environment role played by the CREMA members to support forest
management and conservation efforts, and CREMA’s framing as a decentralized
institution,55 it is not surprising that Bontori CREMA was chosen by IUCN to pilot a
REDD+ project and also recognized by the Ghana FC as one of the early seven REDD+
pilot projects in Ghana (Baruah et al. 2016). Choosing this particular CREMA also
helped IUCN leverage its experience in the area and build on its previous work to launch
project activities.
Ghana’s early piloting activities were influenced by inclusive and devolved
approaches to governance, and the nested approach to REDD+ which allowed
participation of a wide range of stakeholders such as NGOs, communities and private
forestry businesses. The Ghana FC looked for proposals (through newspaper
advertisements) that could pilot and independently demonstrate REDD+ activities on the
ground.56 From among the proposals that were received, seven pilot sites were selected—
two in the Western Region, two in the Central Region, and one pilot site each in the
Eastern, Ashanti, and Brong Ahafo Regions. These long-term associations with CREMA
and previous conservation projects also increased the exposure of CREMA stakeholders
to the REDD+ issues and activities, helping them express their opinions, concerns, and
expectations related to the project. Access to information on both the CREMA and
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Interview No. 18; Male, Essandokrom, 5 July 2012.
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I argue elsewhere that CREMA is not devolved and is non-representative with limited decision
making powers and functions to address the needs of its constituency
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Personal communication with a government official of the Forestry Commission, June 2012
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REDD+ is differentiated by the social position of the specific actors, as discussed in the
later sections of this chapter. While some interview participants have heard about
REDD+ as a result of attending meetings and training, not everybody in the village was
aware of the initiative. Also, those who were engaged with the CREMA were also
involved more with REDD+-related activities.
Recent research has shown how experiences of integrated conservation and
development projects have shaped initial pilots of landscape-level REDD+ action
(Minang and van Noordwijk 2013). On the other hand, scholars and experts engaged with
the technical and institutional issues of REDD+ implementation have suggested ways in
which REDD+ initiatives can draw lessons from the community or collaborative
management, and forest conservation (Agrawal and Angelsen 2009; Cronkleton et al.
2011; Hayes and Persha 2010). Thus, the piloting of the pro-poor REDD+ in the CREMA
site exemplifies how assemblages such as CBNRM incorporate “new elements onto the
assemblage, reworking existing elements for new purposes and transposing the meanings
of key terms” (Li 2007, 284). At the same time, it shows how the REDD+ assemblage is
a combination of various policies (techniques of government), expert analysis, and
recommendations of not only project practitioners and policy makers but also academics,
scholars, and all others who have a stake in engaging with REDD+ work from the global
to the local scale.
4.3 Participation and CREMA/REDD+
Scholars and practitioners have argued that the participation of local communities
in REDD+ is likely to reduce implementation costs of REDD+, including those related to
measurement, monitoring, and enforcement at least in the short term (Chhatre et al. 2012;
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Larrazábal et al. 2012). From this standpoint, as discussed in Chapter 1, the institutional
set-up of CREMA is seen by many as the appropriate platform to address many of the
key issues linked with REDD+—boundary demarcation, free prior and informed consent,
ensuring democratic decision making, creating sustainable institutions and mechanisms,
clarifying land and tree tenure and carbon rights, as well as establishing equitable benefitsharing arrangements (Asare, Kyei, and Mason 2013). The FC of Ghana also recognizes
the CREMA mechanism for implementing REDD+. The Ghana Wildlife Policy 2012 and
Ghana’s REDD R-PP both support the CREMA approach as a means for implementing
REDD demonstration projects and pilots (GHANA REDD RPP 2010; GHANA FOREST
AND WILDLIFE POLICY 2012). It is therefore not surprising that those (e.g., Forestry
department officials, agroforestry experts) who seek to gain the consent of farmers and
create agroforestry subjects recognize CREMAs as critical to the achievement of Ghana’s
social, economic and environmental goals.
One of the key actors who was involved with REDD+ Readiness activities both at
a project site and at the national level remarked how CREMAs offer a great foundation
for REDD+ because of its “good local involvement”:
When Ghana started talking about REDD+ and preparing for REDD, we were
also looking at how best to get REDD+ on the ground. And one of the main …
platforms that was identified in Ghana was several collaborative resource
management approaches on the ground. There is this community forest project,
there is the CREMAs, a lot of them, some employed by the Forestry Division,
some by the Wildlife Division. But a careful look around identified the CREMAs
as having more than various structures in terms of local involvement, having local
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government authority also there and then legal, some legal framework and policy
support. You had all the frameworks that is needed to kick start REDD. So at the
discussion-level, and not even going towards a policy-level, where they are
considering CREMAs as the basis to roll out REDD because it has very good
local involvement there. So they want to use these structures to build on some of
the things that REDD wants to see on the ground. So it’s not that CREMAs are
ready yet. No. CREMAs have been there as a structure or as an approach. But how
best can we move CREMAs, their functions, so that they can really satisfy the
criteria for REDD on the ground.57
As illustrated by the preceding section and the representative quote, the policy
discourse sees an integrated conservation and development approach such as CREMA as
the building block for REDD+ in Ghana. On the other hand, interviews with farmers
reveal that views on CREMA/REDD+ are influenced by their multiple subject positions.
While most people in the study site had heard about CREMA, only farmers actively
involved with CREMA activities had heard about REDD+. They displayed a general
understanding of REDD+ and its relation to climate change and had been invited to a
REDD+-related event at least once. These leaders and members of the CREMA claimed
to have disseminated the information/knowledge among their peers, often creating
unrealistic expectations from REDD+. Not every interviewee demonstrated a clear
understanding of the project membership and participation. However, while most
associated CREMA and REDD+ with trees, interviewees who were relatively well-off
more demonstrated a more nuanced understanding of the projects.
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Interview No. 49/NGO Official; Male, Domongo, October 3, 2012.
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I started planting as an individual farmer, other people were skeptical, but sooner
or later the timber will be finished, companies are sacking people, and have
installed machines for splitting the timber. I know the value of timber and the
beauty of trees and the environment value of trees. The IUCN and the Forestry
people told me to attend the CREMA meetings and gave training about the
environmental benefits …we are making an umbrella under the CREMA briefing
the people about the environmental benefits of trees.58
On being probed about whether he had heard about REDD, he said that “before it
was REDD and now it is REDD+.” Although he could not distinguish between REDD
and REDD+, he talked about the environmental benefits of trees that trees conserve
energy, water resources, and stores carbon. He also displayed an understanding of
monetary benefits associated with trees as reservoirs of carbon. This case is another
example of an environmental subject produced through CREMA activities. Thus, the
notion of CREMA was inevitably linked to “planting trees,” even though the CREMA
has a much broader mandate. Based on the interviews, seventy percent of respondents
were aware of the CREMA, but only twenty percent of them could demonstrate an
understanding of the link between CREMA and REDD+/carbon. During the interviews,
farmers listed teak (Tectona grandis), odum (Milicia excels), Ofram (Terminalia
superba), mahogany (Khaya ivorensis), wawa (Triplochiton scleroxylon), Cedrela
(Cedrela odorata), and Emeri (Terminalia ivorensis) as the species growing along with
their cocoa. They also reported the presence of kola nut trees on their farms. The number
of trees planted on the farm varied from 2500 to 20 trees.
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Interview No. 14; Male, Achichire, June 16, 2012.
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While not everyone in the area articulated the linkage between CREMA and
REDD+, the following quote is one of many instances when farmers mentioned trees and
tree planting in response to a question about how they viewed the CREMA project:
CREMA is for strengthening forestry for sensitizing people about the need to
plant trees, skills acquisition and make their lives better. I have planted trees and
have about 50 trees, which I started inter planting with cocoa since 1994, for the
trees to give shade to cocoa. They are timber species such as mahogany, ofrum,
odum I planted trees because of the environment benefits because they takes up
smoke and cleans the air.59
4.4 Anticipation of Benefits from CREMA/REDD+ Shapes Participation
Various community-based natural resource initiatives in the past have shown that
stakeholder perceptions, needs, and expectations attached to the outcomes of a project
often do not match what interventions seek to achieve (Kellert et al. 2000). Community
perceptions of the project benefits matter because the achievement of environmental
interventions is contingent on the ways in which goals and aspirations of various
stakeholders are aligned with existing resource use practices, cultural meanings, roles in
society, and belief systems (Carr 2013). In this context, irrespective of whether or not
CREMA/REDD+ can fulfill their stated objectives, the stakeholder perceptions of the
CREMA/REDD+ and the anticipated benefits of interventions do matter because they
influence people’s decision to engage with these interventions and will continue to
influence the intended objectives of these governmental interventions.
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Interview No. 23; Male, Kamaso, June 1, 2012.
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I found that benefits from the projects, whether realized or anticipated, were
important means by which the farmers justified their engagement with the project
activities. As one female CREMA member stated why she chose to plant trees on her
farm:
I know very well that the forest and the trees are finishing and that their strength
is depleting … there were not much trees, the sun is too much and the water is not
there. So I realized when I plant the trees I am going to get these benefits and it
would also benefit the future generations … I hope that the CREMA will give me
money but then the money will be from the tree planting … the cocoa's money is
immediate but in the trees I will benefit later. Even if it doesn’t come to me, I
have children who will benefit from the trees that I have planted.60
Another farmer, Mr. Odoi, like most non-Waasa migrant cocoa farmers in the
area, traces his roots to the Eastern region of Ghana. Mr. Odoi has been living in Kamaso
for more than twenty years, but it was only four years before my interview with him that
he started his cocoa farm when his father informally gave some land to him. Before
having his farm, he was helping his father. He practiced agroforestry, growing timber
trees with food crops such as cassava and plantains. He expressed that he was made
aware of the environmental cleaning property of the trees and the money relationship
with carbon by REDD+ project workers. His story is similar to many other farmers in
Wassa Amenfi who migrated during the expansion of the cocoa frontier in the Western
Region in the 1970s (Amanor 2010).61
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On the basis of the responses, farmers’ perspectives on project benefits can
classified into two main categories: (a) Cash benefits and (b) non-cash benefits. Cash
benefits, as perceived by the interviewees, included income from protecting natural
resources, fees, royalties, gate proceeds, income from utilizing natural resources such as
NTFPs and timber, access to credits, and potential payments through carbon credits. Of
these cash benefits, potential payments through carbon credits were most frequently
mentioned by the interviewees, and cash from selling timber and NTFPs were the most
prominent avenues of cash income perceived by the farmers. Farmers listed capacity
building, infrastructure, ecosystem services, biodiversity, and access to resources for
subsistence, cultural values, the supply of agricultural inputs (seeds, fertilizers) and
extension services, and access to information as the main non-cash benefits of the project.

Figure 4.1 A cocoa farmer on his agroforestry farm. Source: Author
When discussing CREMA/REDD+ benefits, I heard villagers talk about benefit
sharing and equity issues along with the ecosystem services and conservation outcomes.
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They saw CREMA/REDD+ as a means to get their rights over planted trees and carbon
recognized and obtain remuneration that could improve their income. Their interactions
and involvement with forest-related conservation projects changed how they viewed their
rights and roles vis-à-vis those who seek to govern their conduct. Over ninety percent of
the respondents expressed discontent over how state authorities conduct their duties in
managing forests and natural resources while expecting farmers to do much more
regarding forest conservation and maintenance at the local level. A farmer and a village
leader explained why top-down prescriptive approaches for protecting the environment
would not work:
This is our policy. We want the farmers, the holders of the land, to do this and that
for the sustainment of the trees or the environment …it shouldn’t be in form of
just a policy. Everybody has got his freedom. The policy may be there, but how to
implement, it should be negotiated … the government thinks they can say, “Plant
trees,” and then everybody is planting. “Preserve the water bodies,” and
everybody will preserve. You will mention it and it will not work.
Instead, he said that the decision-making processes had to be inclusive and
negotiated at the level of the individual farmer.
Okay, if I protect this tree, there’ll be no contractor coming to fell (cut) it. Yes or
no? If I protect it, could I be given some incentive, let’s say a monthly
maintenance or a yearly allowance to maintain it for the assembly, so that at the
end of the harvest the assembly can go in to harvest it because I have already been
compensated. Okay, should I leave this portion of my land for you to rent it to
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preserve the environment? Because I cannot leave and I and my family suffer for
lack of money.62
He, like a couple of other interviewees who practiced agroforestry, expressed a
duality: accepting certain aspects of the environmental subject-making while also
expressing certain perceptions that are largely absent from the CREMA/REDD+
narrative. Despite the accounts of tree planting, agroforestry, and conservation,
particularly from the members and CREMA leaders, there were numerous occasions
when the same actors contradicted their pro-environment positions, some of which I
discuss in Chapter 6.
4.4.1 Differently Positioned Social Actors Muddle Participation
Important questions are being raised about the terms of participation and the
distribution of benefits in settings marked by significant social divisions. The
participation of local communities and civil society organizations in REDD+ activities is
not as straightforward as often assumed in current debates around safeguards. As many
forested regions in the world, including Ghana, are characterized by the weak rule of law
and low levels of public accountability, REDD+ runs the risk of increasing corruption
and elite capture in forest governance (Karsenty and Ongolo 2012; Sandbrook et al.
2010).
As one actor from the non-government sector experienced in the implementation
of conservation and development projects stated that although community-based
institutions are supposed to be inclusive and participatory and have good local
involvement, communities are not homogenous and have different interest groups. This
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actor emphasized the role of “facilitation” in aligning these diverse goals and interests for
a governmental intervention to work:
So when it comes to the developing the CREMA you really have to go to the level
the community and understand the community, know the interest groups in the
community, know the power structures in the community, only a few people will
hijack it and at the end it will represent, oh well they came in and everyone wants
to put in themselves all these views and whatever. So right from the beginning
should make a conscious effort to include the facilitation through as much as
possible and get the views of the community as much as possible. Moreover, we
do that through a process here, meaning developing the constitution here is a
process where you manage and just guide them and might even plan to the same
thing we did here. You raise the issue; these are the issues. So how do you think
we can best address it? Do we come up with this plan if we do it this way? No, no
in a committee if we do it this way it will not work. What are the key resources
we can maybe consider now?63
In Ghana, chiefs are often recognized as the de facto leaders in representing
community rights and interests because they are perceived to be easily accessible,
possessing intimate knowledge of local issues, and able to facilitate collective action (
Boafo-Arthur 2001; Kwame Boafo-Arthur 2003). In the migrant villages in the cocoa
frontier, “caretaker chiefs” are chosen from early settler families because they possess
larger land holdings, and play a major role in community decision-making processes.
Participation in the CREMA/REDD+ process was dominated chiefs, sub-chiefs or elders,
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and people whom they knew in their respective communities. For instance, all the
members of the CEC were leaders in their communities, despite the CREMA guidelines
recommending elections to choose leaders. Further, the CREMA Constitutions state that
all individuals residing within the area and having land-based livelihood interests can
become members when they pay registration and membership fees. All the interviewees
expressed that they had never paid any fees, but their membership was based on their tree
planting activities on their cocoa farms, active interest in the environment, and attending
“forestry”-related meetings.
The type of sharecropping arrangement also influences the decisions and
opportunities to participate in the CREMA/REDD+. While early settler families with
larger land holdings are more open to agroforestry: “I came here about 45 years ago from
the Volta Region near Dudwa and now have about 94 acres under cocoa cultivation, have
planted more than 3000 trees on the farm but there is no land (forests) for farm
expansion.”64 New migrant families (<5 years) from the under the abusa system did not
have enough resources (e.g., land, labor) to engage in tree-planting. Most tenant farmers
with usufruct rights under the Abunu system expressed that they made farming decisions
independent of the land title holder and planted trees on farm. Interview participants
expressed reservations about benefit sharing, and potential conflicts with landholders
once benefits from these project activities start to flow (e.g., cash payments for carbon or
timber), or if the “REDD+ money” is not comparable to the income from other cash
crops.
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Thus, the motivations and opportunities for the CREMA/REDD+ stakeholders to
participate in activities are not uniform. Further, the roles they occupy and the identities
they assume within the context of these projects varied (Baruah 2015) and they used
different types of benefits, both current and anticipated, to rationalize their involvement
in the projects. Therefore, the process of environmental subject production through
CREMA/REDD+ is not uniform in any population, or across any set of stakeholders, but
instead a complex, heterogeneous process. It is this complex, heterogeneous set of
environmental subjects that CREMAs, and REDD+ more broadly, must align toward
conservation and climate change mitigation goals.
4.5 Conclusions
While alluding to the broader discourse and debates on surrounding REDD+, this
chapter discussed the perceptions and motivations of various stakeholders engaged in the
CREMA/REDD + projects. This chapter showed how benefits within CREMA/REDD+
are interpreted and enacted at the local scale and how the participants anticipated and
explored past and contemporary tensions associated with the access to those forest
resources and related benefits. This chapter presented empirical evidence to show how
participation of the local population in CREMA/REDD+ projects hinges on prior
engagement with earlier environmental projects and the CREMA/REDD+ potential
remunerations, which played a role in the differential production of environmental
subjects in the research area. In the next chapter, I discuss the common discursive threads
and projects of rule deployed to engage local populations.
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CHAPTER 5
GOOD AIR STEWARDS: ENGAGING FARMERS FOR PRODUCING CARBON
THROUGH NARRATIVES OF ENVIRONMENTAL CRISIS AND
INDIVIDUALIZING RISK
5.1 Introduction
The previous chapter discussed the perspectives of farmers on participation in
agroforestry through the CREMA/REDD+ projects, showing how their involvement with
past conservation and development initiatives in the area helped them act as particular
kinds of environmental subjects and conferred legitimacy to the projects (Sandker et al.
2010). The chapter also showed how anticipation of benefits from the projects shapes
participation. This chapter discusses the complicated ways and practices through which
the diverse interests of the various actors engaged in the two focal interventions are
brought together, and connections are forged between them to ensure participation, for
specific objectives—that of mitigating climate change, conservation and sustainable use
of forest resources, and improving rural livelihoods—primarily through agroforestry
activities. This chapter addresses the second research question—How is participation
achieved in the ongoing interventions?
5.1.1 Expertize In Governmental Interventions
Conceptualization of many development projects often starts with the assumption
that project constituents have limited prior knowledge and technical capacity to address
the problem. Implementation strategies, therefore, rely on experts’ knowledge and
discourses to both frame the problems, identify risks and offer potential solutions
(Bumpus and Liverman 2011; Peet and Watts 2011). Miller and Rose (1990) defined
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expertise as “the social authority ascribed to particular agents and forms of judgment on
the basis of their claims to possess specialized truths and rare powers” and represent
“neutrality, authority, and skill” (Miller and Rose 1990). The typology of experts put
forward by Wilson (2006, 502) is also useful to understand what constitutes expertise:


area of theoretical expertise (such as agricultural economics or tropical
medicine);



sector of work (for example, agriculture or health or finance);



the level at which one works (policy maker, strategic manager, extension
worker and so forth);



employment relation (such as consultant or salaried employee);



institutional context (for instance, local government, national government,
NGO, donor agency);



the authority of experience (for example, expatriate or local);



nature of experience (in one location or in many locations) (Wilson 2006)

Experts draw power and legitimacy via recognition from both those who govern and
those who are governed. Experts continue to exert influence in development projects
because they are recognized to possess relevant techniques and authoritative knowledge
which can enhance the self-regulatory capacities of the project constituents (i.e., invoking
“community”) and thereby improve their lives.
The fundamental criticism against expert-driven development is that expertise is a
means to depoliticize governmental interventions because the decisions and rationale
behind these interventions are represented as driven by neutral, free, and apolitical
experts. Arguments have also been made that experts’ knowledge and discourses are
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often privileged over local forms of knowledge for “political, economic and
administrative reasons” (Kasanga, Kotey, and others 2001). Using a case of community
forestry in Nepal, Nightangle (2005) showed how different forest users adopt the ideas
and practices promoted by forestry experts, and in that process how the literate and elites
in the community were considered the legitimate subjects to translate the discourses of
scientific forestry while “managing” the behavior of marginalized forest user groups
(Nightingale 2005). In another instance, Birkenholtz (2008, 2009) showed how
groundwater conservation in Rajasthan, India, was framed as a technical problem
ignoring antecedent political, economic and social realities with claims and counter
claims about the program benefitting the technocratic and upper castes elites in the area,
and side-lining lower caste farmers (Birkenholtz 2008, 2009). These cases show how
“expertise” is part of governmental technologies and is not apolitical in purpose.
The rationale for the past and current interventions at the Bontori CREMA site can
be explained in terms of two main environmental issues as framed by experts. First,
Ghana’s forests are fast depleting and conditions deteriorating,65 and there is an
increasing need to conserve and protect what is left. Second, the HFZ in the Western
Region of Ghana has the only remaining large tracts of tropical forests both in on—
reserve and off-reserve areas, is the final cocoa frontier in Ghana and faces threats due to
illegal logging exacerbated by the booming domestic timber market and expansion of
cocoa cultivation. These factors have contributed to the engagement of the Ghanaian
state, international agencies, and donors with forest conservation issues in the region.
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Structural adjustment policies of the 1980s led to economic growth at the expense of the rapid
deterioration of Ghana’s forests. See Owusu (1998).
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What these particular framings do not do is to contextualize the problem within the
historical and current political and economic processes. Figure 5.1 below is an example
of how experts have framed (also the dominant narrative) the forest degradation problem
in the HFZ of Ghana. This was presented to the Forest Investment Plan (FIP)66 subcommittee in 2012.

Figure 5.1 Expert framing of the “Drivers of Forest Degradation—in the HFZ.
Source: www-cif.climateinvestmentfunds.org, World Bank67
Based on the analysis of policy documents and interviews with high-level actors,
the next section presents the results of the rationale and choices used to define the
ongoing interventions—the CREMA and the pilot REDD+ project central to this
research. In the subsequent sections, the three major themes that emerged from the
analysis of data are discussed. I argue that the following three practices were assembled
to make participation achievable in the specific context of the CREMA/REDD+
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FIP is submitted by interested countries to access FIP grants and loans. FIP is a $775 million
funding window of the Climate Investment Fund designed to provide grants and low-interest
loans, channeled through partner multilateral development banks such as the World Bank, to help
countries address the drivers of deforestation and forest degradation.
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https://www-cif.climateinvestmentfunds.org/sites/default/files/meetingdocuments/final_version_ghana_fip_presentation_0.pdf.
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interventions: narratives of ecological crisis, delivering assurances to address the crisis
through technical fixes and expert knowledge, and individualizing risk and
responsibilizing the project constituents to address the crisis.
5.2 Rationale of the Focal Interventions
Carbon forestry projects in the developing world have not arrived on a blank
canvas. In an edited volume discussing the implementation of emerging REDD+ projects
in Africa, the cases demonstrated how most sites have long histories of environment and
development interventions, in particular, related to forestry (Leach and Scoones 2015);
also discussed in Chapter 4). In seeking to examine and analyze how participation in the
CREMA/REDD+ pilot, central to this particular research, was achieved, I found it useful
to consider the justifications that informed these interventions at the first place, because
these projects should be seen not only in the context of their on-the-ground realities but
also in the context of previous interventions. Li (2007) argues that governmental
interventions are often reassembled, incorporating “new elements and reworking old
ones; deploying existing discourses to new ends; transposing the meanings of key terms”
(pg. 205). She argues, with specific reference to community forestry management, that in
the age of neoliberalism, governmental apparatuses and practices are not stable but “are
concerned with grafting new elements onto the assemblage, reworking existing elements
for new purposes and transposing the meanings of key terms” (Li 2007, 284). According
to Li (2007, 284–5), these transformations of governmental interventions:
…are well illustrated by shifts in community forest management in the context of
neoliberalism. There are two potential relays or points of connection. First and
most obviously, the emphasis on community is compatible with a neoliberal
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concern to downsize and decentralize bureaucratic functions. It is easily
assimilated to agendas stressing the need for “good governance,” democracy and
the rule of law. Second and more contentiously, community forestry is being
promoted as a way to promote entrepreneurialism and market efficiency.
Communities, advocates of this version propose, can supply forest products and
services at a competitive price.
I have already shown through the review of the literature (Chapter 2), how
REDD+ is a project of environmental governance—a reassembled form of CBNRM.
CREMAs in Ghana emerged as the primary institutional mechanism utilized by the
government for managing wildlife outside protected areas by incentivizing local
communities. In principle, CREMAs are supposed to create reciprocal relationships
between people living near protected areas and reserve boundaries, and the state by
supporting a lucrative bush-meat market through sustainable meat production as long as
communities meet an obligation to manage these resources for the long term. Senior
officials of the WD involved in conceptualizing and implementing the CREMA approach
mentioned that the stringent forestry and wildlife laws, based on fortress conservation,
alienated communities from their resources. Despite the policing techniques used in
Ghana until the early 1990s, conservation efforts were not yielding results. This is
illustrated in the words of a senior Park manager, who when asked why the CBNRM area
(CREMA) initiative, as a Ghana wide approach, was first started, said “wildlife outside
the protected areas are not abundant and parks do not have buffers … so the CREMA is a
strategy to serve as buffers because if there are CREMAs fringing the parks, the activities
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within the zone are regulated …so they offer protection, security.”68 Interviews with
government officials, policy makers and officials of local and international institutions,
including funding agencies involved in CREMAs, revealed that the main rationale behind
the CREMA approach was the idea that secure rights and responsibilities at the local
level led to better conservation outcomes. A very senior member of the WD stated that
the environment, and specifically deforestation, often is not part of national political
issues but that resource allocation is very much a political decision. Further, since timber
exports have been consistently one of Ghana's top foreign exchange earners, there is little
political motivation to completely transfer forest ownership and management to local
communities. Instead, the “collaborative” and “community-based” projects were adopted
as a middle ground seeking to maintain some level of central control over this key
resource while attempting to improve conservation outcomes.69
Thus, these interventions aimed to achieve multiple goals (e.g., benefits,
livelihoods, property and tenure rights, governmental control and efficiency,
sustainability, conservation) for multiple stakeholders (e.g., donors, NGOs, local
communities, politicians, technical experts) and drew from diverse discourses of
environmental crisis, integrated conservation and development, and participatory
approaches in development. Specific actors (WD, NGOs, Government, donors, farmers,
traditional leaders) and diverse group of experts (agroforestry experts, conservationists,
social scientists, development workers, lawyers, policy makers), translated these
discourses into policy instruments and materialized them into practice. For instance,
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Interview No. 50/Government Official; Male, Domongo, November 12.
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Interview No. 44/Government Official; Male, Takorade, December 13, 2012
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agroforestry experts often came to the cocoa farmers and advised them to combine shadetolerant varieties of cocoa with timber and fruit trees, arguing that both forest
conservation targets and the livelihood needs of the cocoa farmers can be met by
adopting the practices endorsed by experts.
The following conversation, which took place between a Senior Government
official and me, highlights how the CREMA approach was designed by pulling together
these diverse elements:
Respondent: It was in the early to mid-90 when the Wildlife Division decided to
do an evaluation of the mandates … of the various subsectors that are under the
ministry. So we implemented what is called the FRMP, Forest Resource
Management Projects, and the Wildlife Division was part of it. Also, we did an
assessment to understand how we had fared in terms of delivering on that
mandate that has been given to us as a division. And, in doing that a number of
things came up … wildlife numbers were going down and we sought to
understand exactly what was going on and also to fix it because at the time I think
globally we were all talking about reforms within the forestry subsector, … in the
final analysis we realized that wildlife numbers were going down for three
reasons; bush meat as food, wild fires and the nature of the law itself.
Author: Wildlife laws?
Respondent: Yeah, the legal environment … was partly to be blamed for declining
the numbers and prospects of wildlife… also the fact that we are losing our
forests, the habitats, habitat loss … Of course at the time also globally there was
this agitation for more participation for local communities and all this and that.
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So all those issues played up and as something to consider for the kind of reforms
that we need to do.
So we said, okay fine that we needed at the time to come up with something that
would involve local communities more in wildlife conservation. I say this
particular because of the nature of the law. The nature of the law was such that it
was more or less like wildlife it belonged to government … government was
managing wildlife … at the same time the people did not have authority or power
to manage anything and even if one was to like say if you kill it …the law more or
less criminalized the use … for the local (communities) it means the will to
conserve wildlife properly was not there, so we had to find a way of roping in you
know local communities and who could manage their resource properly …
So from then we started thinking about how to come up with a good
concept of community participation. We had a series of workshops the major
stakeholder workshops to think through what we thought was possible. We had
some international study tours and all that trying to understand the system that
was in placed in number place East Tanzania, Kenya, Namibia, all those other
places … some of our strategies to engage with that communities to establish a
kind of rapport that would reduce tensions that have built up as a result of our
relationship of those communities through law enforcement and all those kinds of
things. So what I want to say is that it has come through a long history of
development as far as where we are today.70
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The above quote shows how different discourses of environmental crisis, that is,
forest, wildlife, and habitat loss; and of community-based participatory approaches as a
solution are assembled under CREMA—in the form of governmentality that mobilizes
and aligns the interests of a wide range of actors around the use and management of
forests.
On the other hand, pro-poor REDD+ is an example of how discourses on
ecological modernization and environmentalism and market-based solutions to climate
mitigation are consolidated into practice. The objective of pro-poor REDD+ is “to
demonstrate a tangible reduction of deforestation, a direct improvement of forestdependent livelihoods and, ultimately, long-term security of forest-based carbon stocks in
key forest rich regions,” with the purpose of aligning this objective with “national
poverty reduction strategies” and ‘forest governance reforms” (IUCN Pro-Poor REDD
Project Document, pg. 3) The rationale behind the Pro-Poor REDD Project was therefore
to demonstrate the prospects of jointly addressing concerns about deforestation, climate
change, biodiversity loss, and poverty by reducing emissions from deforestation and
forest degradation—win–win situation for everybody who is involved. In doing so, the
interests of the cocoa farmers are aligned with the REDD+ mandate at the global,
national, and local scales.
The fact that the pro-poor pilot REDD+ project in the Wassa Amenfi West
District builds on the CREMA approach is illustrated by the following commentary made
by an NGO official involved in REDD+ negotiations in Ghana and also CREMA
implementation at specific sites:
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Ghana started talking about REDD+ and preparing for REDD, we were also
looking at how best to get REDD+ on the ground. And one of the main, I will say,
platforms that was identified in Ghana was several collaborative resource
management approaches on the ground. There is this community forest project,
there is the CREMAs, a lot of them, some employed by the Forestry Division,
some by the Wildlife Division. But a careful look around identified the CREMAs
as having more than various structures in terms of local involvement, having local
government authority also there and then legal, some legal framework and policy
support. You had all the frameworks that is needed to kick start REDD. So at the
discussion-level, and not even going towards a policy-level, where they are
considering CREMAs as the basis to roll out REDD because it has very good
local involvement there. So they want to use these structures to build on some of
the things that REDD wants to see on the ground. So it’s not that CREMAs are
ready yet. No. CREMAs have been there as a structure or as an approach. But
how best can we move CREMAs, their functions, so that they can really satisfy
the criteria for REDD on the ground. So it’s actually, it’s been discussed at the
local-level and now it’s actually at the national, policy-level discussions now, as
far as I know.71
Further, the pro-poor REDD+ project also advances the market-based agenda by
claiming to promote “good governance” through the participation of vulnerable groups
and entrepreneurialism and market efficiency by focusing on clarifying the land and treetenure rights (planted) of the project constituents.
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As illustrated above, the rationale behind the CREMA and REDD+ shares a
common thread—which was the identification of a collective problem that needs to be
resolved and the co-construction and negotiation of project participation to resolve that
risk. The subsequent sections of this chapter present the practices that were assembled to
engage the local project’s constituents, that is, the cocoa farmers in agroforestry activities
for better outcomes for the environment and society. It highlights the rationale underlying
the promotion of “community-based and collaborative principles” as a way to make the
intervention legitimate and inclusive.
5.3 Forging Alignments for CBNRM and REDD+ to Mitigate the Risk
A common CREMA narrative amongst interviewees, both project implementers,
and project constituents, centered on environmental degradation and deforestation. While
the crisis narrative surrounding the CREMAs tended to be more concerned with the
declining wildlife numbers and encroachment issues near parks and forest reserve
boundaries, the justification for REDD+ focused on climate change and deforestation.
Mr. Adom, Director of a local NGO which serves as the Secretariat of the Bontori
CREMAs, said that once the cocoa farmers at the project site understood and witnessed
how “forest cover has changed a lot in the area, rains have become less frequent,” so the
risk (of climate variability and forest change) and the monetary benefits were good
enough for people to plant trees. The founder of the local NGO of the Bontori CREMA
and his family were the pioneers in planting teak trees on a commercial basis. The
founder had an eclectic professional life and considered himself an “expert” both in
Ghanaian administrative affairs and in agroforestry. Despite claims that environmental
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change was enough to make tree planting reasonable, Adom noted the fact that “his farm”
was the “the teaching and learning ground” helped people to participate in agroforestry:
Forest cover has changed (lessened) a lot in our area, rains have become less
frequent and people were seeing these changes. This was enough motivation for
us to plant trees but initially it was very difficult to convince people because it is
about investments, money. Farmers easily do not want to put money; they want to
see if it is feasible. Our farm became the teaching and learning ground for the
community and particularly after our first harvests, when money flew in many of
them bought the idea of tree planting.
He further added that:
… the most challenging issue is the complete ownership of the whole process.
How do we increase our income and fulfill our aims? Our aim is that natural
resources is our concern and our livelihood and therefore at all costs we should do
something about it, even to the point of taking the policy and make sure that the
policy responds to what we are trying to do. Our Constitution denies the people
who owns the resources, the access to those resources.72
This particular view also represents the beliefs shared by many local people who
have been hostile and uncooperative to projects that restrict access to forest resources and
reduce income and employment opportunities. Sentiments such as the one expressed
above also illustrate the instability around the narratives associated with these
governmental interventions that seek to regulate behavior and institute change. As Adom
notes, the crisis narrative was not enough to spur planting: instead, that narrative had to
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be combined with demonstrations of practices that would work to address that crisis
before it gained the force of action.
As discussed earlier, the urgent crisis of declining wildlife numbers and shrinking
forest areas needed resolution and improvement. Therefore, also fundamental to this
narrative of environmental crisis and for those who were involved in governing the crisis,
was the assumption that the problem can be addressed and managed sustainably through
collaborative actions with communities living near forested areas. At the specific project
site, the parties involved in governing natural resources, especially the project
implementers, saw the local communities involved with the CREMA as the suitable
group to carry out restoration of degraded forests and take care of the resources to avoid
the consequences of a poorly managed environment. The following quote from a senior
community member and Chairman of the CREMA illustrates this point:
First and foremost, the CREMA is to bring the farmers of the community together
for their strength and unity. Secondly, to manage and tap the resources within the
community for the betterment of the farmers. Third, we are to plant trees and
guard the forests to promote the ecosystem and four we are to come together for
all the NTFPs of the forest sustainably, rear small ruminant animals and the bees
in a sustainable livelihood of the people between the community and the CREMA
as a whole.73
In addition to what he deliberately wanted to convey, based on the popular
environmental discourses and his position in the intervention, it may be safely concluded
that these ideas were not his own. This respondent had also expressed his frustrations at
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the delay in seeing “carbon payments” but at least agreed to continue with his agroforestry practices in the short-term— “for the next couple of years.” His justifications
were also necessary because many other farmers also situated their actions within a
general framework of conservation and climate change discourse (also discussed in
Chapter 4). Statements such as “When I first came here it was covered with forests, but
now rainfall has reduced and less regular and erratic”74 or “it used to rain here a lot, but
now it has been changing and becoming more irregular”75 were common.
Whether it was the CREMA or REDD+, trees, and agroforestry not only
connected the two interventions but also the project stakeholders. As one woman farmer
explained when asked about her motivations for joining the CREMA and planting trees,
“people came here told us that they will put a tag on the trees and that the trees have
carbon and the trees will give us good air.”76
Speaking about the specific Bontori CREMA, at the study site, a senior official of
the forestry department in the Wassa Amenfi District said that the CREMA with REDD+
was a “good idea” because this particular CREMA, with its emphasis on tree-planting
and maintenance of trees on farm, could mean that REDD+ will bring incentives both for
planted and naturally occurring trees on private farms for which farmers did not have any
ownership or user rights.77 A community leader, who was also a farmer, agreed with the
CREMA and REDD+ linkages saying, “getting involved in the whole process of the
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climate change, planting more trees if we (CREMA) want to enter into the carbon market
then we want to get something out of it,” also adding “but, even then not that (entering
the carbon market), our interest is just to plant trees for every day.”78
For IUCN, the other agency at the project site, implementing the pro-poor
REDD+ intervention, CREMAs can provide the necessary local structure for carbon
forestry or REDD+ projects in Ghana. The West African Protected Areas Newsletter,
IUCN, 2011 states that:
CREMAs and other provisions designed to support dedicated community forests
could be key mechanisms for engendering local control and participation in
REDD+ initiatives especially in the off-reserve areas since they are an effective
means of local self-mobilization and have delivered tangible results from
activities that would qualify for REDD-plus, such as tree-planting, forest
restoration and on-farm, tree based diversification.
The West African Protected Areas Newsletter, IUCN, 2011.
NGOs have been critically often examined with observations that they privatize
government functions and shrink state capacity. Despite these widespread criticisms, both
the government officials as well as community members felt that the NGOs were playing
a crucial role in facilitating the interventions. Therefore, besides the staff of the Ghana
Forestry department, donor agencies and the communities at the project site, the two
NGOs were also important parties in forging the alignments for implementing the focal
interventions.
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The community members also agreed to the role played by NGOs in
implementing community projects. As one farmer put it, “NGOs give us lessons to
awaken our spirit in farming.” for example, a senior executive of the CREMA described
how the role of NGO’s extends beyond monetary help to “backing up communities” and
advocacy (NE, Achichire). Similarly, an official from another NGO involved with the
implementation of a CREMA project near the Mole National Park mentioned that NGOs,
in general, get involved with projects such as the CREMA to act as a facilitator in areas
where local communities might not trust government officials, what government officials
during the interviews had referred to as “the failure of fines and fences.” Importantly,
these interventions align with their programmatic mandates:
… when we came in we were able to get the district’s magistrate, the courts to
come and help the communities engage with the Park because the community was
worried about losing their land or being forced out of the area because of the
CREMA. And if you really understand what the CREMA really stood for...the
concept of giving management authority, to them was like Ok, it's just a ploy.
And most of the communities around the Park have an experience where they
have been evicted from the park. So that history is very fresh in their minds.
We talk about land conservation, management issues, and the constitution and but
especially when issues of demarcation comes in, they very much link us to their
lands been taken away. So you have to engage in the district courts and they have
to go to the community and explain to them, assuring them that there is presently
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no law that allows the government to take community land without adequate
compensation.79
Another elite member of the community expressed similar sentiments. As he
positioned the role of his NGO in representing community rights and offering CREMArelated expertise, he was skeptical of the term “collaborative” used in the context of
CREMA; he thought the CREMA approach was rather authoritarian. The following
conversation illustrates his point:
Author: You mentioned that the CREMA has to be self-sufficient at some point
and nobody needs to represent a CREMA, so until when do you see ARD (local
NGO) being associated with the CREMA? Or do you think the ARD support
would be required for the CREMA as long as it is there?
Respondent: That is what it is, and that is why we need ARD to serve as a
secretariat that will energize the system and engineer the department… so, the
ARD is not an external institution, it is an internal institution that will have to last,
it is parts and parcel of the CREMA but then the ARD has the ability to go
beyond the institution of CREMA by establishing other CREMAs by using the
experience and the lessons and sharing it with a larger community and other
people who desire to engage in that style of governance. You mentioned the word
“collaborative”, in Ghana the way they use it, is a little bit misleading.
Author: Yes, It’s the government’s term, I am using it, I am not saying it
(CREMA) is collaborative; this is what they (Government) are saying.
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Respondent: They [the government] just design it up there and pass it down for
you to follow [so it is not collaborative].80
The practices of identifying an existing problem, in this case, loss of habitat and
deforestation, and delivering solutions for improvement via collaboration with
communities illustrates how perceptions were shaped by issues such as landscape
degradation, forest conservation, and livelihood change. The overarching message from
the respondents was unambiguous: environmental degradation was real, and collaboration
with the communities was a necessity for addressing these issues on the ground. Through
their construction, the CREMA and REDD+ projects aligned the various interests (e.g.
farmers’ interests in improving income; NGO's mandate on agroforestry and restoration
activities; the State’s objective to conserve forests) in a manner that moved these projects
forward.
5.4 Delivering Assurances to Address the Crisis through Expertise and Capacity
Development
Even though collaboration with the local communities were seen as an essential
precursor, and the community was considered to be the appropriate body to carry out the
agroforestry for obvious benefits, a recurrent theme that emerged from the data was a
sense amongst high-level actors that the communities are not “ready” to shoulder such
responsibility without adequate “training” and “capacity building”, that they required
“guidance” and “facilitation.”81 Talking about the issue of community capacity and
CREMA establishment, a senior forestry official said:
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You cannot just form it (CREMA) and then leave it. It needs some guidance –
technical guidance. It gets to a point where it works for itself. I can easily foresee
when things have gone round in full circles, some of them learn by working for
themselves, it will happen. For it (CREMA) to perform, you don’t have to leave
them to themselves, but you have to help guide it for some time.82
An official from IUCN involved in the implementation of the REDD+ pilot also
described the role of implementing agencies such as NGOs, in the following words:
… they (community) need guidance, like when there is a child, the parents have to
take care and likewise this CREMA concept is a new concept that has come to
Ghana, and any NGO that leads to its formation or its developmental area should
still be up in doing and leading those people and seeing the people are doing the
right thing and are capable enough. They (NGOs) should not lead, they should be
in the background and supporting, pointing them [the community] when they are
going wrong, and enhancing their [community] capacity for involvement. 83
These notions—that the projects have a solution to the overall degradation and
deforestation problem, that people’s lives can be improved through management and
technological remedies such as agroforestry was perpetuated via experts who work with
the stakeholders and adopted by the farmers who participated in the projects. As one of
the interviewee, Nana Gonu said:
Mr. N (referring to an NGO official) told us that there have been changes in the
climate and there has been changes in rainfall, where we are getting direct sunrays
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due to the trees which have been cut and to prevent it that is why we have to plant
more trees, and we should also include trees in our farms such as for cocoa and
cropland so that it would prevent the crops and cocoa from drying out.84
As illustrated by this quote, the narrative focused on climate change, where
rainfall patterns, temperature, and tree cover has significantly changed. However, the
participant also indicated that the source of this knowledge was the project expert who
had communicated this information to the cocoa farmers engaged with the project. It
further illustrates how the expert used the rhetoric of “risks” to make the participant care
about planting trees, to mobilize the farmers’ interests and align them with those of the
CREMA and REDD+. Another farmer directly attributed his knowledge to the project
experts, stating that IUCN and FC told him to attend the CREMA meetings and trained
him on the environmental benefits85 of the intervention. All the community participants
expressed that there was a lot of awareness generation carried out by the forest
department and CREMA members.
These sets of quotes illustrate that the interventions of experts had captured the
imagination of the CREMA's constituents by delivering notions of improvement and
development in several spheres of their lives (income, better livelihoods, preventing crop
failure, good air). However, the narrative was also accompanied by a particular framing
of deforestation and forest degradation and the impending associated risks (crop failure,
environmental degradation) and what the particular responsibilities were at the individual
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level of the cocoa farmers, as well as those of the experts responsibilized to address these
risks.
In forging these alignments with the community, the experts were in general
reflexive about their biases and how these may impact their role as facilitators because
they too felt responsible for the governmental projects and the intended objectives of
these projects. The success of the CREMA/REDD+ assemblage was as much reliant on
these experts as it was for the cocoa farmers and other project stakeholders. As one
Forestry Official said, “… you need someone who is quite knowledgeable and skilled to
facilitate the process. Other than that you may come out with something which many
people will not buy into because they are representing your views of what their
community should do.”86
The role of experts was not only limited to training and project facilitation but as
one senior government official argued, experts should also be able to “facilitate” and
“manipulate.” The following excerpt from the interview with him typifies this attitude:
… if the facilitators are not good then there could be a few challenges. You could
have people hijacking the thing. There are some people, if you do not control their
way [behavior, attitude], they are likely to hijack. And if that happens you could
have a structure there [institutional structure for the project], but the support base
would be weak. Because they [project constituents] know the person and nobody
likes the person, and that person is the one leading with them then your thing
[project] might not stand for a long time.
But if it is well I’m expecting a good facilitator—when he spots somebody like
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that—to know how to deal with that person in the whole scheme of things.
Sometimes we have a kind of word, I mentioned it somewhere and people
laughed a lot, but it is a good word. In Ghana for those of us who do these things
we have something called “Facipulation” …you facilitate a little, and you
manipulate.87
In this sense, experts were expected to build the capacity of the cocoa
farmers by way of “reorganization of knowledge and social power” (Birkenholtz 2009,
216) to guide project implementation while ignoring the local socio-political issues and
intra-group dynamics.
One migrant cocoa farmer, who was seventy-three years old came to the region in
1963, shared his experience with higher cocoa yield resulting from following the advice
of agricultural extension workers as follows:
When I came to Kamaso it was all bushy [presence of thick naturally growing
vegetation] here, I used to clear the land and burn the bushes. Cocoa can be
planted directly from the pods or seedlings, but I preferred to raise them in
nurseries because, in the beginning, there were a lot of rats who would eat the
cocoa beans. When I first came here, I used my intuition about planting distance
but agricultural specialist are saying that ten ft by ten ft are good for planting
cocoa, so I am using it now because the farm is more systematized and organized.
But both systems worked. Initially, the production was slow per acre, but now it is
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two bags per acre because of extension services like spacing and fertilizers (ring
or broadcast) method.88
Another woman also shared similar sentiments, stating how following the advice
of agricultural extension services helped her boost cocoa production even with decreasing
soil fertility and erratic rainfall.89
As discussed in the previous chapter, the major selling points used by experts to
deliver notions of improvement through the projects were: direct monetary benefits,
better living conditions through enhanced ecosystem services—clean air, cooler
temperature and benefits to the current livelihood that is, cocoa cultivation, shade, soil
fertility. Once the interests of the farmers’ were aligned with the project activities, their
capacity “built’ through training they had to be made responsible for carrying out their
duties toward the environment and society.
Armed with techniques that promise better livelihoods, efficient resource
management via empowered communities, and decentralized decision-making processes,
those with expert knowledge seek to enhance community self-regulatory capacities in a
manner that aligns community preferences and choices with broader policy objectives.
Such governing through the community aim to de-socialize and individualize risk, with
subjects encouraged to ‘‘shape their lives according to a moral code of individual
responsibility and community obligation’’ (Rose 1996, 347).
High-level actors repeatedly evoked the “collaborative principle” and the sense of
“community” to mitigate some of the shortcomings inherent in the past forest and
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wildlife management policies, but they also asserted that the communities should be held
responsible for the resources they use. As one NGO official working with communities
on the CREMA implementation said, “People should be held responsible for the
resources they use because, without those resources, they would suffer. Their livelihood
would be compromised and then what happens?”90
Interviews91 pointed to the emerging debates over the past two decades about the
durability and sustainability of many local resource governance institutions. Such
institutions are critical for securing rights and responsibilities at the local level in a
manner that leads to better conservation and therefore is one of the main rationales for
working with communities through the CREMAs.
The discourse about deforestation and environmental degradation and the role of
the community and the individual in addressing the collective crisis also seemed to
inform the individual behavior of the project constituents. For example, talking about this
issue a 65-year-old male Wassa farmer, said, "My main motivation for joining CREMA
is to plant trees to replace the cut-down trees so that the excessive threat and irregular
rainfall can be reduced and it will benefit not just Ghana but the whole world." Another
farmer, also echoed a similar sentiment about the role of the individual in the collective
crisis and the value of tree-planting, noting that he had a personal responsibility to plant
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trees even in the face of skepticism from his peers because he understood the value of
trees and the ecosystem services that forests provided.92
However, the capacity to self-govern in this current environmental crisis was not
only limited to the individual farmers at the village level, but also for experts. As one of
the Senior Wildlife Division officials elaborated on the pro-activeness of higher-level
actors (the experts) in achieving the objectives of resource management through
CREMAs:
Author: So you are saying, in the department, each of you senior officers has the
independence to bring in new ideas to incorporate in this project. The challenges
you face is regarding budgetary allocation and political will to support those
initiatives?
Respondent: Even the political will, I will leave it … at our level, if you yourself
(the officer) are convinced about the concept, then you should have a plan to do it,
even without any support from the top … nobody tells us to see if we can try and
get funds for them just because we are convinced about what can come out of the
CREMAS. We are just pro-active. We write to foreign organizations also … you
can convince somebody about these communities that are governing their
resources and are given an opportunity to do that. I am not waiting for any more
political will. If they did, all the better for me … before 1994, the Forest and
Wildlife policy probably didn’t have any senior authority ready to work with local
people. So already with that policy, the way has been open. So I see the officers,
the people who would love to have some more money as an indication of political
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will from the government. But if it is not coming, my question is what can we do
also? … It would have been very good if as a country, we saw the situation and
did something to halt the declining situation. It appears that if we do not put in so
much effort, then at a certain point in time, we will lose all that is around us. 93
The previous sections show how, through alignment of interests and
internalization of experts’ discourses, not only the cocoa farmers but also experts and
other stakeholders are responsibilized, and these discourses are consolidated into practice
at the project site. The fact is I too as a researcher situated my role and responsibilities in
responding to this global environmental crisis (see Chapter 1).
While the environment crisis discourse seems to have materialized through the
situated subjects and their attitudinal changes and modifications in farming practices, it
also served as a benchmark for perceptions and evaluations—for those who aligned with
the project objectives and those who did not.
As a 70-year-old farmer from Ataase, stated:
Some people mocked me about planting trees; somebody even told me to cut
down all the trees and advised me instead to plant rubber commercially
profitable]. When you put sheep out and they do not return you do not put the rest
out until the first the first batch returns. So other people won't join [in tree
planting] until they see the benefits (cash or material).94
Clearly, cash benefits are a key motivator in many farmer’s decisions to engage in
tree planting. However, Ghana’s complex tree tenure system also seems to be another
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major barrier to people adopting tree planting. One female farmer from Metiya Meba
village expressed what she thought was a key factor which demotivated many from
participating in the ongoing intervention, “Farmers feel entitled to naturally growing trees
on their farms, and this seems to be a pertinent problem.”95 What she referred to as a
“pertinent problem” was the people’s reluctance in adopting agroforestry because of lack
of rights over naturally occurring trees on their farms.
In addition to the above-stated reasons, few other women farmers with whom I
spoke to, stated a few additional challenges in participating in the interventions via tree
planting. As a forty-five-year-old female Ataase farmer, put it, “as a woman, distance is a
problem for me to move the seedlings from Kamaso [the nursery is located in a separate
community] and apart from the house hold work, I have to satisfy my husband … I feel
that a woman have to share more work burden than man.”96
The following segment of a conversation with the Chief’s wife in Kamaso
expresses a similar idea and provides insight into why many women are not participating
in tree planting and agro-forestry activities, “I think a man spends more time on the farm,
but women overall spend more time working throughout the day. I have to prioritize
working in my vegetable garden so that I can have food to cook.” 97 All these women
quoted here participated in the ongoing interventions, but spoke about these challenges
and that - these challenges might have influenced other women’s decision not to
participate. Other reasons cited by the respondents for not diversifying their farms
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through agroforestry were: not having enough land, timber trees taking years to mature,
not seeing direct cash benefits, fear of overshadowing cocoa and diseases, farmers
perception about growing trees as a bad investment, lack of ownership over naturally
growing trees on their farms, and preference for cash crops such as cocoa, rubber, and oil
palm.
5.5 Conclusions
This chapter, through empirical evidence, demonstrated how the CREMA/REDD
+ governmental interventions helped align the interests of both the subjects and those
who sought to govern through the ecological crisis narrative, by finding expert solutions
to manage past failures and addressing deforestation and climate change, and making the
environmental subjects do their part in this collective effort to address climate change,
conservation, and SDGs. The chapter also discussed the barriers faced by individuals who
could not take part in agroforestry. In the next chapter, I discuss the contextual issues that
may influence the realization of the objectives of these projects.
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CHAPTER 6
CONCLUSIONS
6.1 Epilogue
On a typical morning in the village a couple of weeks away from Ghana's general
elections, I was about to start interviewing a CREMA resident who was also an exmember of the local District Assembly (Respondent 1, Male). Moments earlier, I had
finished interviewing the man's elder sister (Respondent 2, Female) who was a cocoa
farmer but was not a participant in the CREMA/REDD+ projects. While my interpreter
and I were preparing to interview her brother, she was having a conversation with another
member of the CREMA (Respondent 3, Male).
Respondent 2 to Respondent 3: They (government) say we should reserve the
forest for the future generations, but most of them (children) have come because I
have given birth and my kids have also given birth, so whom are we reserving
these forests for? Will you ask them (referring to my interpreter and me) to make
sure that they tell the authorities that we need more land for farming …They
(referring to the interpreter and me) can tell that (to the government) we need to
farm where the forest is now.
Respondent 3: "Oh don’t worry these answers are for answering sake, a time will
come in the future when we all will share the forest land for agriculture, and the
would be no reserve forests, and we will weed (clear, slash, and burn for
agriculture).
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Respondent 2: Even if every person gets a pole (a local unit of land measurement
colloqually equivalent to the distance between two electrical poles), that would be
beneficial instead of the forest standing there and the community not getting any
benefit from it.
The woman while addressing me said, “Obroni, [foreigner, stranger] you go and
tell to give some portion of the forest for farming, there is no more land for farming.”98
It is important to note that Respondent 3 was one of the key participants in this
study. As a leader of his community, he had attended numerous meetings, training, and
workshops on forest conservation organized by the Forestry Department and NGOs. He
also volunteered as a community forest guard. Despite the views he expressed in the
above conversation, his responses during his semi-structured interviews were proconservation and pro-environment. This conversation is an example, embedded in
everyday practices that challenged the existing regulatory frameworks on access to forest
resources and their use. People perceive that the governmental rationalities related to
forest conservation have failed to deliver, and they feel deprived of the very resources
they were protecting because sanctions on using those resources were very much a part of
their lived reality.
Other stakeholders in the CREMA/REDD+ process offered similar sentiments.
Some expressed their views without any inhibition, stating: “I will burn all the trees that I
have planted if I am not allowed to use them.”99 They spoke about alternative strategies
and plans if agroforestry and REDD+ payments failed: “I will plant rubber, which is
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much more profitable than the tree planting.”100 People also spoke of the challenges of
mainstreaming agroforestry if the discourses of REDD+ do not materialize in practice,
and why it might be difficult to enroll other environmental subjects in the absence of
tangible REDD benefits.
Similar sentiments were echoed by others who were participating in the
CREMA/REDD+ process. Some expressed their views openly stating: “I will burn all the
trees that I have planted if I am not allowed to use them”101while others spoke about
alternative strategies and future plans if agroforestry and REDD+ payments failed “I will
plant rubber, which is much more profitable than the tree planting”102 while others spoke
about challenges of mainstreaming agroforestry, if the discourses of REDD+ do not
materialize in practice, and why it might be difficult to enroll other environmental
subjects in the absence of tangible REDD benefits.
Even though there was no organized and visible resistances to the governmental
efforts surrounding forest conservation, I witnessed ‘everyday forms of resistance’ during
my field work. The vignette above, and the wider case in this dissertation show how both
those who participated in the CREMA/REDD+ initiatives and those who did not share
similar views about interventions that sought to regulate their behavior regarding natural
resource access and use. The vignette also shows that governmentality (through
mobilization of discourses) is useful for framing and examining CREMA/REDD+, but
falls short of addressing local subject formation, power, and knowledge and
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socioeconomic and political contexts predating the interventions (Carr 2013, 2014, Li
2005).
6.2 Summary of Findings and Contributions
This dissertation, while examining “community-based conservation” approaches,
explored the challenges that emerge at the intersection of project proponents and
communities, and of communities and the global community and international
negotiations. These challenges that obstruct the realization of the objectives of
CREMA/REDD+. In this sense, this dissertation revealed the contradictions between
governmental rationalities, discourses, and operationalization of these discourses in the
context of CREMA/REDD+, and speaks to larger concerns for the realization of REDD+
goals through other means which mobilize discourses of conservation and participation.
In Chapter 1, I laid out the research context and provided the background on
collaborative resource management areas (CREMAs) and REDD+ in Ghana. I described
the relevance of these interventions for agroforestry activities associated with
conservation, rural development, and climate change mitigation goals (Asare, Kyei, and
Mason 2013; Canadell and Raupach 2008; DeFries et al. 2010; Garrity 2006; Luttrell et
al. 2013). I then described the natural resource landscape of the Western Region of
Ghana, including land tenure and tree tenure arrangements, elements that were framed
both as problems and technical fix by governing agencies (Tutu, Ntiamoa-Baidu, and
Asuming-Brempong 1993).
In Chapter 2, I presented reviews of theoretical approaches to better understand
the CREMA/REDD+ interventions in the cocoa landscape of Ghana. Through a review of
literature I argued that (1) CBNRM approaches came out of a long history of efforts to
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decentralize resource governance; (2) REDD+ is reworking existing elements of CBNRM
for new purposes and defining “social protection” or “safeguards” to address equity
issues and account for past injustices in natural resource management; (3) “safeguards”
such as community “participation” and “tenure” are not straightforward; and (4) these
safeguard principles may impact the realization of meaningful environmental, social, and
economic goals through REDD+. Of importance here is the idea of governmentality
(Foucault 1985), a means of framing the mechanics and goals of problem identification
that lead to the definition and framing of a problem (Dean 1999; Li 2007; Rose 1999).
Extending this theoretical framework to CREMA/REDD+, I examined global and subnational environmental policies to identify the discourses and rationalities that were
mobilized to achieve project objectives (Agrawal 2005; Birkenholtz 2009; Li 2007).
Responding to the calls of critical development scholars to focus on social justice issues
of developmental interventions, I also examined how these efforts mobilized equity
discourses (safeguards) (Bebbington 1996; R. Chambers 1997a; Sunderlin, Larson, et al.
2014). This helped to unravel the socio-economic rationale for a focus on communitydriven environmental conservation and increasing household incomes through
agroforestry intervention to achieve rural development. Finally, governmentality gives
frame to the literature on natural resource decentralization and local democracy (Agrawal
and Ribot 1999)
Crook and Manor 1998; Ribot 2003; Ribot et al. 2008) by demonstrating how
strong institutions, good governance, and congruence between discourse, law, and
practice serve as means of mobilizing wider interests and reshaping projects of the rule,
to protect the environment and human well-being.
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I presented the research methods in Chapter 3 and explained the rationale for, and
advantages and limitations of, the chosen data collection methods. Based on the empirical
data as well as data collected from government and NGO documents, local newspaper
articles, rural radio programs, and personal observations, I discussed the characteristics of
the study population and the methods used to recruit the study, participants. I also
presented the methods for data analysis to demonstrate the rigor and validity of the data
and resultant findings. I explained the importance of looking at contradictions and gaps
between discourses, practices, and outcomes (Ribot 2002), furthering the goal of
generating conclusions that are of practical relevance.
In Chapter 4, building on the data collected through semi-structured interviews
and a review of policy documents, I elaborated how climate change and deforestation
were problematized in the Wassa Amenfi CREMA/REDD+ and how promised benefits
through the ongoing projects were linked to governing the conduct of agriculture by
cocoa farmers. I found that these alliances between parties who want to govern with
objectives such as conservation, tenure rights, payments, livelihood improvement, and
sustainability encouraged people at the project site to engage in agroforestry activities
despite the reservations about tree planting and skepticism about equity issues in benefit
sharing from these projects voiced by those living in the project site.
In Chapter 5, I demonstrated the complicated ways and practices through which
the diverse interests of the stakeholders were brought together, and connections were
established between them to meet the specific goals of the ongoing interventions—
mitigating climate change, conservation, and improving rural livelihoods. I showed how
the discourses and practices of the CREMA/REDD+ interventions helped to align the
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interests of the REDD+ stakeholders and those who sought to govern through the crisis
narratives of deforestation, environmental degradation, and anthropogenic climate
change. These interventions also sought expert knowledge and guidance to remedy these
issues while seeking to influence the behavior of project stakeholders so that they
perform their part in the collective effort to address climate change and other
environmental challenges.
Through Chapters 4 and 5, I showed how decentralized community-based
initiatives such as CREMA and REDD+ pilots focus more on expectations and
mobilization of participatory discourses than on effective practice and outcomes, thus
undermining policy mandates. The identification of this particular mobilization of
discourses of participation and governance within the project of rule embodied in
CREMA and REDD+ through an in-depth assessment of decentralization efforts revealed
the gaps between discourse, governmental rationalities, and practice. This I believe is a
major contribution of this dissertation regarding reconceptualizing forest governance
under REDD+, along with generating empirical evidence that demonstrates the clear
implications of my findings for policy (Ribot 1995; Larson and Ribot 2007).
As the case study of Bontori CREMA, under the Phase II of “Towards Pro-Poor
REDD,” undergoes institutional and governance reforms and project participants wait for
REDD+ “money to come,” this case study compels us to rethink the “win-win” rhetoric
surrounding the establishment of carbon projects and REDD+. These market-based
projects require long-term and significant cash investments both from the public and
private sector to succeed. Pre-existing local community institutions, and having/creating
compliant communities, is not a guarantee for investment outcomes. If investments do
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not come, then will REDD+ mostly be about receiving money from the international
donors to support business-as-usual conservation and development projects? Moreover,
will that be enough?
6.3 Participation as Mobilization
Despite the invocation of democratic processes in policy discourses and the
recognition of the need for effective local participation, this dissertation showed the
contradictions between discourse and practice. In practice, participation was a political
tool to mobilize specific discourses for achieving project activities. This is because
intervening agencies (local and donor NGOs, government agencies) ignored democratic
processes and building robust institutions, and instead focused on measurable outputs
(Ribot 1995; Ribot and Larson 2012). Democratic participation and participatory
decision-making processes consume time, are costly, and are often not the indicator of
choice for implementing agencies to monitor and assess development projects (Collier
and Hoeffler 2005).
Examining the accountability issues and participatory processes in CREMA, I
showed how its legal and administrative framework tended to empower elites. Further, I
showed how the recognition of a local NGO also empowered elites over rest of the
population, both contradictions of the CREMA’s mandate (Baruah 2015; Baruah et al.
2016). The legal and administrative framework of the CREMA tended to empower the
traditional elites, for example, when the recognition of a local NGO by state authorities to
oversee natural resource management encouraged the formation of new elites. I found
that despite their stated commitment to democratic processes, the Government of Ghana
and international authorities presumed the accountability and ability of NGOs to
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represent local interests in forest resource management. I also found that institutional
mandates and technical and managerial priorities are used by higher-level authorities to
rationalize the omission of accountability and representation in CREMA activities.
Disregard for democratic processes thus centralized decision-making and rendered
political processes technocratic at the cost of effective local participation and control over
forest resources. Also, the higher-level authorities’ promotion of tree tenure privatization
reduced public engagement by enclosing and thus discounting the public forest domain.
The combination of these factors compromises the accountability and ability of CREMAs
to represent local interests.
This dissertation showed how despite the rhetoric and policy framings of the
importance of democratic and participatory decision-making processes as essential
principles of REDD+ safeguards, implementing agencies take these principles for
granted. Collier and Hoeffler (2005) argued that the access to and use of natural resources
in weak institutional and governance settings may be problematic and lead to internal
conflicts surrounding rights, access, and usage among local communities (Collier and
Hoeffler 2005). As discussed in the previous chapters, institutional structures, good
governance, and the process of unifying the rights of various stakeholders are crucial for
the implementation of REDD+. Successful outcomes from REDD+ depend on the
resolution of conflicts (related to rights, access, and usage) and the adequate
representation of diverse goals and interests in a manner that aligns individual and
community interests with policy goals of REDD+. CREMAs in Ghana are seen as
appropriate vehicles for operationalizing REDD+ on the ground because they have some
aspects of these ideal institutional and governance pre-conditions. However, without
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addressing governance issues, tenure insecurity, and opacity regarding the specific role of
non-state private actors and NGOs, CREMAs need to be promoted and implemented with
caution (Baruah 2015). Otherwise, these interventions are likely to perpetuate existing
inequalities in decision-making processes regarding access to forest and land resources
and hinder pro-poor outcomes sought under REDD+.
6.4 Future Research
In many respects, this dissertation establishes how global frameworks such as
REDD+ are fraught with competing interests and are interpreted at multiple scales, and
how the realization of objectives is contingent on local context, uneven power relations,
and diverse subject positions of the stakeholders that must be aligned and mobilized to
achieve project goals. It also elucidates the local place-based realities of a communitybased conservation initiative that was brought into conversation with market principles
and the commodification of nature through a global policy such as REDD+, and how it is
shaping local forest governance creating allowing new outcomes such as efforts to clarify
tree tenure rights, as in other places (Lawlor et al. 2013). For some cocoa farmers at the
specific CREMA site in Ghana, the arrival of decentralized forestry interventions created
an enabling environment to advocate for tree tenure reform and local rights over forest
resources. At the same time, REDD+ has been utilized by multiple kinds of “local”
authorities (chiefs, government agencies, farmers, experts, and new elites, local NGOs) to
strengthen claims over their power to manage forest resources. Further studies are needed
to understand how the emerging spaces for political possibilities could transform statesociety-community relation in forest governance and what those changes could mean for
forest conservation and human well-being.
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Another potential avenue for research is to examine the role of CREMAs in forest
rehabilitation, on biodiversity, how they affect land use and land cover change, and their
impacts on habitat quality outside of protected areas and forest reserves. Ghana is losing
forests at the rate of 20 kha/year (FAO 2015), and most of the remaining forests are in its
250 forests reserves and seven national parks in a human modified matrix. Eighty-six
percent of these forest reserves are located in the HFZ and cover about 20 percent of the
zone (Odoom 2005). About fifty-five percent of the total reserve area in Ghana is
“degraded” while twenty-nine percent is in “very bad condition” (Hawthorne and AbuJuam 1995). Biogeographers and ecologists continue to emphasize the impact of forest
habitat loss and fragmentation on biodiversity (Brashares, Arcese, and Sam 2001, Kupfer,
Malanson, and Franklin 2006).While studies recognize the implications of forest habitat
loss on Ghana’s biodiversity (Blay et al. 2008), the ecological impacts of
habitat management around dispersed protected areas, through collaborative initiatives
such as CREMAs, have not been explored in depth. Forest loss and fragmentation reduce
habitat resources and divide species populations, change species interactions and
disturbance regimes, modify micro-climate conditions, and increase exposure to invasive
species and pests, but the severity of many such impacts vary greatly across the humanmodified landscape mosaic (Kupfer, Malanson, and Franklin 2006). The thirty CREMAs
in Ghana, all operating with a mandate to manage wildlife and conserve natural resources
outside protected areas, require further examination to understand their effect on
conserving biodiversity and wildlife habitat. Studies on the impact of forest
fragmentation and habitat loss conducted in tropical forests show that the primary forest
habitats are irreplaceable for their role in sustaining biodiversity in tropics (Gardner et al.
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2009; Gibson et al. 2011), But there is little information on biotic responses to varying
levels of human usage across the landscape across or the potential value of humanmodified systems for species of concern. Use of some recently available globally
consistent satellite derived data (Hansen et al. 2013), and geospatial platforms could
be leveraged to answer some of these questions (Global Forest Watch 2014; GEE 2017).
This dissertation did not deeply engage the political economy of forest
conservation via CREMAs and REDD+. Political economic studies of the environment
emerged from an interest in the interaction of state and non-state actors within
environmental and economic policy processes (Clapp and Dauvergne 2005). Studies on
the political economy of reforestation and forest restoration programs in Asia–Pacific has
identified key governance challenges, including corruption and rent transfer to elites
(Barney 2008; Barr and Sayer 2012). A range of actors and institutions (ministries,
timber and plantation companies, NGOs, elected government, political and corporate
elites, Chiefs, local population) are involved in the CREMA/REDD+ process. Therefore,
the political economic analysis will illuminate the political and economic interests at
various scales in REDD+ and the implications of those strategic interests for forest
governance and achieving the intended outcomes of these interventions (Luttrell et al.
2013). For example, in the context of REDD+ and the economic incentives that it may
present, it will be worth examining the evidence on potential re-alignment of power
relations among chiefs, the REDD+ constituency, the state, forestry bureaucracies and
donors and how these re-alignments influence existing strategic relations. As the
CREMA/REDD+ interventions talk about training and “capacity–development” of local
farmers, a political economy analysis will also reveal the realities that marginalize them
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(Faye and Ribot 2017). The findings from a political, economic analysis could potentially
help policy makers structure REDD+ in a way that it delivers benefits across the broad
range of stakeholders involved in the REDD process in Ghana.
6.4.1 Revival of the CREMA through Governance Reforms
As of March 2017, the Bontori CREMA is operating under Phase II of the
“Towards Pro-Poor REDD” project implemented by the International Union for the
Conservation of Nature (IUCN), in collaboration with its local partner Codesult Network,
and the Wildlife Division of the Forestry Commission.103 The revival involved providing
financial and technical support to the CREMA to develop a comprehensive five-year
Action Plan. The IUCN facilitated the process to design an operational strategy for the
CREMA that will help revamp the governance structures and instruments of the CREMA
and guide it on a path to sustainability. Implementation of the Action Plans was initiated
with a review of their CREMA Constitution to reflect current challenges and
opportunities. They also developed and published the District Assembly bylaws that
provide the CREMA with the needed legitimacy in a government bulletin. The initial
phase of reviving the CREMA is expected to end by May 2017, and the future replication
of the activities currently undertaken in the second phase of the REDD+ project will be
subject to the availability of additional funds.

103

Personal Communication, IUCN Official, April 2017.
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APPENDIX A INTERVIEWS WITH COMMUNITY MEMBERS
Interview
Number
Sex
Place_of_Interview
Interview_Date
Age_2012
Interview 1
Female
Achichire
4-Jul-12
56
Interview 2
Female
Achichire
4-Jul-12
39
Interview 3
Female
Achichire
4-Jul-12
60
Interview 4
Female
Achichire
4-Jul-12
63
Interview 5
Female
Achichire
4-Jul-12
53
Interview 6
Female
Ataase
14_June_12
45
Interview 7
Female
Gonukrom
12 Dec
44
Interview 8
Female
Kamaso
01_JUNE_12
55
Interview 9
Female
Metiya Meba
13-Jun
47
Interview 10
Female
Kamaso
15_June_12
45
Interview 11
Female
Achichire
15_June_12
42
Interview 13
Male
Achichire
16_June_12
80
Interview 14
Male
Achichire
16_June_12
62
Interview 15
Male
Achichire
15_June_12
67
Interview 16
Male
Ataase
14_June_12
70
Interview 17
Male
Ataase
14_June_12
56
Interview 18
Male
Essandokrom
5_JULY_12
70
Interview 19
Male
Gonukrom
12_Dec_12
51
Interview 20
Male
Gonukrom
12 Dec_12
62
Interview 21
Male
Gonukrom
12 Dec_12
59
Interview 22
Male
Kamaso
31_MAY_12
65
Interview 23
Male
Kamaso
01_JUNE_12
45
Interview 24
Male
Kamaso
06_JUNE_12
52
Interview 25
Male
Kamaso
07_JUNE_12
58
Interview 26
Male
Kamaso
08_JUNE_12
60
Interview 27
Male
Kamaso
09_JUNE_12
55
Interview 28
Male
Kamaso
10_JUNE_12
50
Interview 29
Male
Kamaso
10_JUNE_12
73
Interview 30
Male
Kamaso
10-Jun
73
Interview 31
Male
Kamaso
7th June
57
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Interview 32
Interview 33
Interview 34
Interview 35
Interview 36
Interview 37

Male
Male
Male
Male
Male
Male

Metiya Meba
Metiya Meba
Metiya Meba
Metiya Meba
Metiya Meba
Pebase
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13-Jun
13-Jun
13-Jun
13-Jun
13-Jun
15 Dec

61
66
68
49
50
65

APPENDIX B
INTERVIEWS WITH HIGH LEVEL ACTORS
Interview Number

Organization

Sex

Location

Date

Interview No. 38

DISTRICT
FORESTRY
SERVICES (DSF)

M

Asankragwa

25_Apr_12

Interview No. 39

DFS

M

Asankragwa

25_Apr_12

Interview No. 40

DFS

M

Asankragwa

5_July_12

Interview No. 41

M

Asankragwa

25_Apr_12

Interview No. 42

DISTRICT
ASSEMBLY WASSA
AMENFI WEST
DFS

M

Asankragwa

17_June_12

Interview No. 43

IUCN GHANA

M

Asankragwa

17_June_12

Interview No. 44

REGIONAL
WILDLIFE DIVISION

M

Takorade

13 Dec

Interview No. 45

IUCN

M

Accra

14 NOV 2012

Interview No. 46

WILDLIFE DIVISION

M

Mole

20 November

Interview No. 47

IUCN

F

Asankragwa

4 JULY

Interview No. 48

WILDLIFE DIVISION

M

Accra

14 NOV

Interview No. 49

AROCHA GHANA

M

Damongo

20 November 2012

Interview No. 50

RMSC-KUMASI

M

Kumasi

14 SEP

Interview No. 51

GEF SMALL
GRANTS GHANA

M

Accra

15 NOV

Interview No. 52

FSD WASSA
AMENFI

M

Asankragwa

3 JULY

Interview No. 53

DISTRICT
ASSEMBLY WASSA
AMENFI WEST
ARD - LOCAL NGO

M

Asankragwa

13 OCT

M

Accra

20-Dec

DISTRICT
ASSEMBLY WASSA
AMENFI WEST

F

Asankragwa

30 MAY

Interview No. 54
Interview No. 55
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APPENDIX C
INTERVIEW GUIDES
A. Villagers (CREMA and Non-CREMA members)
-

Tell me about yourself—name place of birth, what you do for a living etc.

-

Have you heard about the CREMA? How?

-

Are you a member?

-

Tell me how you got involved with the CREMA

-

What are the activities of the CREMA?

-

Who are the CREMA office bearers in this community?

-

What about the executive Committee members?

-

How do you elect your CREMA leaders?

-

Have you taken part in any CREMA elections?

-

What has the CREMA done for the community? For you?

-

What else can be done?

-

Who do you think is your leader?

-

Does the leader listen to people’s needs?

-

Do you trust your leader? Why?

-

Can the community influence their leader?

-

Who does the elected official represent?

-

Do you think your leader has enough power to respond to people’s needs?

-

Have you heard about REDD+/Forest carbon? How?

166

-

What is it?

-

Whose forests are these you think? Who should be looking after them?

-

Do you go to the forest? Why?

B. IUCN Project personals
-

Who are the local actors and institutions working with you here at Wassa Amenfi
West?

-

What kind of support you give them and what do you expect in return?

-

Who decides who you work it on ground?

-

What are forestry related interventions are in place?

-

What do you look for in a local partner?

-

What is the central government mandate on representation in the forestry sector in
Wassa Amenfi West?

-

How do you understand representation and participation? Is one important than
the other?

-

Explain stakeholder selection

-

Explain selection of representatives from among stakeholder groups.

-

What do you do with regards to accountability of representatives?

-

How does the IUCN view representation by the local institutions and how do they
view their skills and capabilities to achieve project goals?

-

What and to whom is the IUCN accountable to?

-

What accountabilities do you imagine local institutions to have to the local
population?

C. District Forest Department
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-

Who are the local actors and institutions working with you here at Wassa Amenfi
West?

-

What kind of support you give them and what do you expect in return?

-

Who decides who you work it on ground?

-

What forestry related interventions are in place?

-

What do you look for in a local partner?

-

What is the central government mandate on representation in the forestry sector in
Wassa Amenfi West?

-

How do you understand representation and participation? Is one important than
the other?

-

Explain stakeholder selection

-

Explain selection of representatives from among stakeholder groups.

-

What do you do with regards to accountability of representatives?

-

How does the FSD view representation by the local institutions and how do they
view their skills and capabilities to achieve project goals?

-

What and to whom is the FSD accountable to?

-

What accountabilities do you imagine local institutions to have to the local
population?

D. Representatives of elected local governments (unit committee members)
Additional question to those listed under villagers
-

Tell me what you do for the community as an elected representative?

-

How do you discharge your duties and responsibilities?

-

Who do you think you are accountable to?
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-

What about listening to people’s needs? What do you do about it?

-

What about people’s trust in you? Why?

-

Who do you represent?

-

Tell us what do think about the role of traditional leaders in responding to
community needs

-

Do you think you have enough power to respond to people’s needs?

-

Do you have any power related to the forestry sector?

-

What changes would you like to see?

E. CREMA executives
Additional question to those listed under villagers
-

What powers CREMA has to respond to people’s needs?

-

What more power and functions can help CREMA? Please elaborate.

-

How do you collaborate with the FSD and IUCN?

-

What about the role of CREMA on REDD+ implementation?

-

What about the role of CREMA after REDD+ implementation?

-

Do you think people trust CREMA as an institution capable of instituting a
practice of collaborative resource management?

-

Explain selection of representatives for CRMC.

F. Traditional chiefs
-

Tell how you became the chief?

-

How do you discharge your duties and responsibilities?

-

What kind of decisions do you have to make as a chief?

-

Do you make any rules in the community?

-

What about listening to people’s needs? What do you do about it?
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-

What about people’s trust in you? Why?

-

Who do you represent?

-

Tell us what do think about the role of traditional leaders in responding to
community needs

-

Do you think you have enough power to respond to people’s needs?

-

Do you have any power related to the forestry sector?

-

What changes would you like to see?

G. Vignettes on REDD+/Forest carbon sharing
In order to understand people’s perceptions, beliefs, and attitudes toward different
institutions and actors involved in the forestry sector, the context, idea, and
structure of REDD+/forest carbon were explained to them in a simple language.
Relating to their experiences in land and tree tenure, they were asked to comment
on the REDD+ benefit-sharing scheme, on who should get what and why, who
they would trust with the measurement of carbon, tree registration, and
disbursement of benefits under REDD+ or CREMA.
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